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I. INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property (“IP”) policy in the United States is primarily 
aimed at stimulating the creative, inventive, and socially enriching be-
havior of the living. Yet one key aspect of our incentive-based regime 
is intimately linked to the death of the creative contributor. Specifically, 
the term of copyright generally lasts for seventy years following the 
death of the author.1 Such a feature is not the product of policy choices 
in place from time immemorial but rather reflects a contemporary de-
cision to link the duration of exclusive rights to some fixed point in 
time beyond the author’s death.2 In particular, until the 1976 Copyright 
Act,3 copyright protection lasted for a set (albeit lengthy) term of years 
without regard to the timing of the author’s death.4  
The question of what precisely is accomplished by a copyright term 
structured to outlast each author in every case — as a discrete question 
from the overall length of the term — is intriguing. In theory, the post-
mortem feature yields the same benefits as would a lifetime term: it 
provides an author with the prospect of realizing a return on her work 
over the course of her entire lifetime. It also spares her from the need, 
later in life, to compete with her own works that might otherwise have 
entered the public domain. Most directly, the postmortem feature may 
allow her to provide for her loved ones (people or organizations) should 
she die before her work attains its full value in the marketplace.5  
Such protection comes at a cost, however.6 For example, a lengthy 
term of protection may produce heightened search costs for those seek-
ing in good faith to license the work. When the author is no longer liv-
ing, she is obviously unable personally to assist would-be licensees in 
tracking down the relevant copyright holders. In addition, some succes-
sors to copyrights — who may have no particular claim to the rights 
other than biological happenstance — have attempted to deter certain 
                                                                                                                  
1. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). The term of protection for a joint work persists for seventy 
years following the death of the last surviving author. Id. § 302(b). In the case of anonymous 
works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the term is calculated differently — 
by a fixed term of years. Id. § 302(c) (“95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term 
of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first”). While the length of that 
term has been criticized, and works made for hire encompass a large share of commercially 
valuable works protected by copyright, this Article focuses on the general term of “life plus,” 
which pegs the term to the life of the creator plus an additional postmortem period. 
2. As will be discussed more fully below, in the bare sense that the death of the author 
would not have cut short a vested period of protection, the incorporation of a postmortem 
period of protection is a longstanding feature of Anglo-American copyright law. See infra 
Part III.A. Nevertheless, the structuring of the copyright term around the life of the author 
plus some additional term of years is a relatively recent policy choice in the United States. Id. 
3. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
4. See infra Part III.A (discussing the evolution of the copyright term). 
5. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986 320 (1987). 
6. See infra Part V.A (discussing the costs of postmortem protection). 
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kinds of access and use of copyrighted materials for reasons that seem 
idiosyncratic or downright contrary to the public interest. 
Ready examples of this latter phenomenon can be found in the ex-
periences of a pair of chroniclers of the lives of two American Song-
book luminaries. In her biography of the lyricist Dorothy Fields, who 
wrote such standards as “The Way You Look Tonight” and “Pick Your-
self Up,” scholar Charlotte Greenspan described her initial plan to in-
corporate seventy-five of Fields’s lyrics. As Greenspan put it, “It 
seemed natural to me to present together the life and the works for 
which I ha[d] so much admiration.”7 Those plans were thwarted by the 
licensing fees demanded by the publishers of the lyrics ($150 per song), 
and more particularly by Fields’s own son — the executor of Fields’s 
estate — who refused to grant the necessary permissions.8 As a result, 
Greenspan’s biography, a decade in the making, contains only partial 
lyrics (four lines maximum per song) and a guide for readers to other 
sources for Fields’s lyrics, including “the Internet.”9 Had she obtained 
the permissions, Greenspan has no doubt that it would have been a “bet-
ter book.”10  
Greenspan, however, fared better than Frederick Nolan, a highly 
regarded writer who was denied permission to reproduce the lyrics of 
Lorenz Hart, the lyricist of standards including “Isn’t It Romantic?” and 
“Blue Moon.” Nolan accordingly published his biography of Hart with-
out any lyrics at all, explaining in a note to the reader: 
I had, of course, intended to examine many of Larry 
Hart’s lyrics — including some twenty that have 
never been published before — at length and in detail; 
but, unaccountably, the copyright holders denied me 
permission to use any of them. I can only apologize 
and say that I cannot imagine for one moment that this 
would have been the case had Hart himself still been 
alive.11 
Elsewhere, Nolan suggested that Hart’s sister-in-law, a trustee with 
control over his copyrights, refused to license the lyrics because of No-
lan’s reference to Hart’s purported homosexuality.12 
                                                                                                                  
7. CHARLOTTE GREENSPAN, PICK YOURSELF UP: DOROTHY FIELDS AND THE AMERICAN 
MUSICAL xix (2010).  
8. Id. 
9. Id.  
10. See Interview with Charlotte Greenspan (June 6, 2014) (on file with author). 
11. FREDERICK NOLAN, LORENZ HART: A POET ON BROADWAY vi (1994).  
12. See My Hart & I, FREDERICK NOLAN WEBSITE, http://freder-
icknolan.com/My_Hart___I.html [http://perma.cc/99XL-TV6W]; Frederick Nolan, Obitu-
ary: Dorothy Hart, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 25, 2000, at 6. 
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These incidents are troubling because, although cultural gatekeep-
ers, copyright successors may have no particular expertise in the areas 
of their ancestors’ fields.13 Relatedly, they may try to exert control over 
the meaning and interpretation of a forebear’s work even if they have 
no special insight into that author’s artistic intentions.14 In addition, 
“emphasizing prosperity rather than posterity,”15 these successors may 
be insufficiently attuned to the larger arc of cultural development that 
often depends upon unfettered use of copyrighted materials.16  
For these and other reasons, some commentators have recently ob-
jected to the existence of any postmortem period of copyright protec-
tion. Deven Desai has argued that there is little historical support for 
the extension of copyright protection beyond the death of the author.17 
Furthermore, he maintains, the traditional theoretical underpinnings for 
IP rights are also insufficient to justify postmortem rights.18 Utilitarian 
theories, for example, which among other things premise copyrights as 
needed ex ante incentives to would-be authors, fail in this respect since 
few authors are likely to be motivated by the prospect that their de-
scendants will benefit in a tangible way from their works.19 Lionel 
                                                                                                                  
13. See, e.g., Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the 
Problem of Heirs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1827 (2009) (“Genetic connection is no guarantee 
of literary sensitivity or historical responsibility. . . . Lengthy copyrights allow mere 
rightholders to become privileged and sometimes arbitrary custodians of culture.”); Deven R. 
Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 259 (2011) (“Unlike au-
thors . . . their children and their children’s children simply sit back and collect rent without 
appreciation for the creative system upon which their parent drew to create in the first place.”). 
14. See Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Conver-
gence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 595 (1999); Kelly 
Casey Mullally, Blocking Copyrights Revisited, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 57, 92 (2013); see 
also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and 
Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 327 (2006) (“In the case of heirs, those who 
control copyright and artistic legacies following the death of a creator often have the right to 
impose their preferred meanings with respect to uses of protected texts.”). 
15. In re Estate of Hellman, 511 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1987). 
16. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 
719, 725–26 (1945) (quoting Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay to this effect); Garon, supra 
note 14, at 595. 
17. Desai, supra note 13, at 243–44. 
18. Id. at 221 (“In this Article I argue that copyright’s extension after the death of the author 
lacks theoretical grounding and is unjustified.”); id. at 271 (“[T]here is no theoretical basis 
for post-mortem copyright.”). Desai’s principal target appears to be postmortem copyrights 
in the specific sense of the compelled extension of copyright beyond the death of the author 
in all cases that a “life plus” formulation requires. Other statements in his article, however, 
suggest a broader attack on any structuring of the term in which copyrights might survive the 
author. See, e.g., id. at 270 (“Copyright after death was not, need not, and ought not be part 
of a coherent copyright policy.”). In any event, in this Article, I have engaged with the ques-
tion of whether, given the policy choice of a “life plus” formulation, there are any justifica-
tions for postmortem copyrights. 
19. Id. at 256; see also Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 794 
(2003); cf. William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle 
Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 914 (1997) (discussing the most recent term extension 
and arguing that “it is unlikely that any author will be induced to create more works under a 
term of life of the author plus seventy years than under a term of life of the author plus fifty 
years”). Postmortem rights of publicity have been critiqued on similar grounds. See, e.g., 
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Bently, addressing the topic through the lens of authorship ideology, 
has suggested that the “creative link between an author and her work 
may justify protection during that author’s life, but thereafter an earlier 
author’s claim should readily give way to the needs of subsequent au-
thors.”20 Ray Madoff, surveying instances of the “rising power of the 
American dead,” has identified copyright as a species of regime that 
has granted excessive rights to the dead.21 
Absent from the contemporary debate over this issue, however, is 
a systematic study of how longstanding succession law theories and 
doctrines, which govern the at-death transmission of other forms of 
property, bear on the justifications for, and scope of, “postmortem cop-
yrights” — that is, the copyright protection of a work beyond the life 
of its author.22 This Article takes up that task. It applies the justifica-
tions for, and incidents of, the generally robust principle of testamen-
tary freedom, such as the creation of an industrious, wealth-maximizing 
citizenry and the facilitation of intelligent estate planning, to the partic-
ular case of copyrights. For example, it draws upon the well-accepted 
importance of upholding sentimental gift-giving by a testator under 
succession law to address the transmission of copyright interests.  
The comparative analysis undertaken here suggests two principal 
lessons. First, succession law principles do provide discrete, though 
qualified, support for a postmortem term that, in addition to property 
theories more generally, should be considered in any rigorous debate 
over copyright duration. Second, more precision should be used in cat-
egorizing the costs associated with postmortem protection. In particu-
lar, in many instances the costs should be conceptualized as resulting 
from suboptimal stewardship by the living rather than from dead-hand 
control. This is not merely a matter of semantics. Distilling the most 
pressing costs is key to identifying the most appropriate means of ad-
dressing them, such as the shortening of the postmortem term, the rein-
ing in of dead-hand control where it does exist, and/or the instantiation 
of better stewardship practices among the living. 
In applying succession law principles to the copyright regime, one 
admittedly runs the risk of falling into the trap that Justin Hughes called 
                                                                                                                  
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980) (attributing the 
pursuit of fame to motivators other than the prospect of providing commercial advantage to 
one’s heirs); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amend-
ment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 84 (1994) (recognizing the 
tension between rights of publicity inherited by remote descendants and the First Amendment 
rights of others). 
20. Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 99, 101 (2008) (“The idea of authorship points, as much to a reduction 
in that term (to life) as to its further extension.”). 
21. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DEAD 121 (2010). 
22. Cf. Bently, supra note 20, at 101 (“[W]hile the idea of providing for one’s offspring 
maintains some general appeal, it is an idea that rarely appears today in the context of debates 
over copyright.”). 
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a “funhouse epistemology: two things becoming more acceptable by 
mirroring one another.”23 In addition, one runs into a recurrent problem 
when considering the justifications for, and possible adjustments to, 
copyright policy: authors and works exist in so many forms that it is 
nearly impossible to generalize about the effects of copyright law.24 
Nevertheless, viewing the postmortem period of copyright protection 
through the lens of established justifications for transmissions of prop-
erty at death offers advantages: it provides a fuller context for evaluat-
ing the existence and optimal scope of postmortem copyrights. 
Analytical clarity is important in advance of what may be yet another 
congressional revision of the copyright term.25 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines the methodologi-
cal approach for the comparative analysis. Part III traces the evolution 
of copyright duration under U.S. law. It lays out concrete differences 
between the exploitation of a copyright while an author is alive and 
following her death. Part IV discusses the theoretical justifications for, 
and doctrinal elements of, American succession law with respect to 
property more generally, which it then applies to copyright interests. 
Part V categorizes the costs associated with the postmortem term and 
begins to develop appropriate solutions. 
II. DOCTRINAL BORROWING AS METHODOLOGY 
Whether it is appropriate to borrow from one area of the law in 
order to illuminate another is an age-old question. Doctrines and theo-
ries in one area can be deployed to provide helpful perspective on a 
distinct set of issues, but they can also paper over important differences 
between two areas.26 This Part first situates the approach adopted by 
this Article in the relevant legal and scholarly settings. It then addresses 
the specific use of succession law principles to evaluate the postmortem 
copyright term.  
In the constitutional law context, Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai 
describe doctrinal borrowing as “the practice of importing doctrines, 
rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitu-
tional law into another for persuasive ends.”27 While IP is sometimes 
                                                                                                                  
23. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 289 (1988). 
24. See generally Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright Policy and the Problem of Generalizing, 38 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 375 (2015). 
25. See Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty, and Copyright Term: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony on copyright term); see also Joseph P. Liu, The 
New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395, 1404 (2013) (speculating that “Congress 
[might] extend[] the term of copyright protection again”). 
26. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
459, 467–69 (2010). 
27. Id. at 461. 
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said to occupy its own cozy constitutional corner,28 the Supreme Court 
has recognized that a number of features distinguish patent from copy-
right law.29 The Court thus arguably engages in constitutional borrow-
ing when using patent precedents to assess the constitutionality of 
copyright statutes.30 By far the most controversial subject of doctrinal 
borrowing in the IP context, however, is the invocation of traditional 
property law concepts — an interpretive move that clearly also has im-
plications for the application of succession law. 
A. Property Law and IP 
Property systems have long been justified according to one of two 
sets of theories:31 those that emphasize rights,32 and those that empha-
size efficiency.33 In recent years, the question of whether IP should be 
                                                                                                                  
28. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) 
(noting that it was appropriate to refer to patent law in a copyright dispute “because of the 
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law”).  
29. See id. at 439 n.19 (noting that the two “are not identical twins” and advocating caution 
in such cross-pollination); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003); 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277, 2318 
(2013) (arguing against “ready use of comparisons between [copyright and patent law]”).  
30. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 886 (2012) (invoking patent traditions to 
uphold restoration of public domain works to copyrighted status); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201–
02 (invoking patent traditions to uphold term extension of existing copyrights). 
31. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF 
PROPERTY 95–139 (2000). 
32. Rights theorists typically premise the acquisition of rights on the contribution of labor, 
see JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, TREATISE II § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 
1988) (1698), or on the fostering of values such as autonomy and personhood, see G. HEGEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 40–41 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) (1821); see also Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957–58 (1982). 
33. Efficiency theorists ground such systems on the maximization of social welfare. Foun-
dational groundwork for these theories is found in the writings of, among others, Jeremy Ben-
tham. See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 299, 307–09 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, Principles of the 
Civil Code]; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (9th ed. 2014). 
Under the utilitarian outlook, private property provides the security needed for long-term in-
vestments in the use of scarce resources. Id. Harold Demsetz posited that private property 
better facilitates the internalization of externalities — such as the overuse of a particular re-
source — than does communal property, leading to more efficient use of such resources. See 
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356 (1967). 
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treated, legally or rhetorically, as property has garnered much atten-
tion.34 Conceptualizing IP as property provides a readymade frame-
work under which to protect and regulate it,35 including determining 
whether the Takings and Due Process Clauses apply,36 and the advisa-
bility of injunctive relief.37  
The propertarian approach has received mixed reviews from com-
mentators. Proponents see the justifications for traditional property as 
usefully translatable to the realm of IP.38 Richard Epstein, for example, 
while expressing doubt about untethered Lockean labor theories as a 
basis for either regime, nevertheless sees justifications for IP in the 
same utilitarian principles that for him ground property systems gener-
ally.39 However, given numerous distinctions between IP and tradi-
tional property,40 the property-oriented approach also has its 
                                                                                                                  
34. Just as the rise in economic importance of intangible assets more generally at the turn 
of the twentieth century required a legal response, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Manda-
tory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1618, 1638 n.58 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 
46 VAND. L. REV. 305, 324–25 (1993) (recognizing the “expansion of the concept of property 
from land or physical objects to various intangibles” in the early twentieth century); Kenneth 
J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 335 (1980), so too the increase in economic 
importance of IP over the last few decades has prompted a debate over the appropriate cate-
gorization of these interests.  
35. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (describing char-
acteristics of trade secrets that made them protectable property interests under state law and 
the Takings Clause: they could be assigned, form the res of a trust, and pass to a trustee in 
bankruptcy). 
36. See, e.g., id. at 1002–04.  
37. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972). 
38. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2011) (argu-
ing that the “one-to-one mapping between owners and assets” of private property “is the best 
way to handle intangible assets”); Hughes, supra note 23, at 290 (“[T]he labor and personality 
theories together exhaust the set of morally acceptable justifications of intellectual prop-
erty.”). The view that tilling a patch of ground should secure for the farmer rights to the fruits 
of his labor, for example, can support the proposition that novelists and engineers likewise 
should have rights in the products of their creative and inventive efforts. See, e.g., Adam 
Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 41 (2005). 
39. See Richard Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright 
Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4, 28 (2005) (arguing that “once we recognize that trade-offs 
are an inescapable feature of social activity, . . . a sensible system of copyright is not such a 
bad trade-off after all”). Epstein recognizes the salient differences between property and IP; 
he would simply accommodate those differences in tailoring the relevant laws. Id. at 4. 
40. The non-rival nature of IP, its overall purpose in enhancing a particular form of social 
welfare (the advancement of human learning), and the durational restraints imposed by the 
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“for limited Times”), all suggest a degree or more 
of mismatch between IP and property.  
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detractors.41 For them, the property framework has strengthened IP 
rights in ways that have not benefited the public.42  
A third wave of scholars has tried to bridge the gap between the 
two camps, arguing that a property framework need not signal an ex-
pansion of IP rights since property rights themselves are limited.43 
Property concepts can thus be used prescriptively to advocate for re-
straints on IP rights.44 For these scholars, it is not only permissible, but 
also advisable, to draw upon the legal treatment or rhetoric of property 
in discussing the bounds of IP.45  
B. Succession Law and IP 
At the heart of contemporary succession law is testamentary free-
dom, which is a fundamental principle of American law.46 Scholars 
have tendered a number of justifications for this principle, including 
that it comports with natural law, encourages wealth accumulation, 
stimulates industry and productivity, produces happiness, reinforces 
family ties and, as a practical matter, may be the simplest solution for 
dealing with property at an owner’s death.47 As Lewis Simes stated, “A 
compelling argument in favor of [testamentary freedom] is that it ac-
cords with human wishes.”48 In these respects, theories underlying tes-
tamentary freedom overlap to a certain extent with justifications for 
private property more generally. Indeed, the property paradigm itself 
largely incorporates a right to transmit one’s assets at death.49  
                                                                                                                  
41. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 6–7 (2008); Tom W. 
Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523, 523–24 (2008); 
Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 
902 (1997) (“Now, I happen to think that the ‘propertization’ of intellectual property is a very 
bad idea.”); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007). 
42. See generally SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2d ed. 2003). 
43. See generally SINGER, supra note 31. Translated to IP, these limitations explain, for 
example, the copyright defense of fair use. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation 
Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 810–12 (2009). 
44. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Par-
adigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–6 (2004); Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 657, 658–59 (2014); Molly S. Van Houweling, The Dead Hand of Copyright 
1–2 (Oct. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
45. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 652, 657 (2010). 
46. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 46–47 (2009). 
47. See, e.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Succession — Its Past, Future and Justification: An 
Introduction, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); 
Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 
109, 117 (2006). 
48. LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955). 
49. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (equating the right to transmit at death 
with the right to exclude). But see infra note 173 (discussing views of William Blackstone). 
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A succession law50 approach to property ownership and transmis-
sion, however, is not analytically co-extensive with a general property 
law approach.51 For example, a justification for private property prem-
ised on the labor or personhood interests of the initial owner does not 
establish that his successors, who did not so toil or invest of themselves, 
should rightfully succeed to his property.52 A general property ap-
proach also does not dictate the scope of rights that should transfer from 
one generation to the next, or the “rationales, tropes, or other legal ele-
ments”53 that have developed to attend the post-death transmission of 
property. For these reasons, theories and doctrines drawn from 
longstanding succession law principles are useful in isolating whether 
and to what extent society should permit the transmission of particular 
types of interests at death. To date, however, there has been limited 
application of succession law to IP.54 
This is not to say, however, that the topic of copyright’s post-death 
legacy has merited little attention. To the contrary, authors have long 
expressed the view that their copyright interests should be available as 
a means of support for their descendants. In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, British poet Robert Southey made plain his “opinion . . . that lit-
erary property ought to be inheritable, like every other property.”55 
William Wordsworth, too, framed postmortem copyrights partly as a 
means of providing for one’s dependents.56 In more recent times, in 
                                                                                                                  
50. Scholars use a variety of terms to describe this area of law, including estates law and 
succession law. In short, it covers “the law of wills, the law of intestacy, the law of trusts (for 
the most part), the law of charitable foundations, the law concerning ‘death taxes,’ and . . . 
aspects of an arcane field of law that lawyers call the law of future interests.” FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 46, at 4. 
51. Cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2180, 2184 (2011) (acknowledging that “particular distinctions between gifts and wills within 
gratuitous transfers law are justified” and that “[t]he categories we choose to set apart need 
not be pristine to be useful”). 
52. On these distinctions, see infra Parts IV.B and IV.C. 
53. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 26, at 461. 
54. For some extremely insightful takes, see Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and 
Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
163 (1996); Tritt, supra note 47. Another principal instance is the relatively recent debate 
over the descendibility of rights of publicity. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independ-
ence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 207 (1983); see 
also Joshua C. Tate, Immortal Fame: Publicity Rights, Taxation, and the Power of Testation, 
44 GA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (describing ongoing tension surrounding the estate tax conse-
quences of newly minted publicity rights and the likely wishes of the testator or her family). 
55. Bently, supra note 20, at 69 (quoting Letter from Robert Southey to C.W. Williams 
Wynn (May 23, 1813), in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS OF ROBERT SOUTHEY 323 (John 
Wood Warter ed., 1856)). 
56. Id. at 100–01 (quoting Wordsworth); see also Martha Woodmansee, The Cultural Work 
of Copyright: Legislating Authorship in Britain, 1837–1842, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF 
CULTURE 65, 88–89 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2000) (highlighting Words-
worth’s related, though distinct, argument that a postmortem term encourages writers who are 
ahead of their time as opposed to merely “useful drudges”); PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE 
COPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 126–27 (2003) 
(same). 
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connection with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998 (“CTEA”),57 authors, artists, and their successors articulated a 
view of copyright as an economic legacy to support one’s family,58 
comparing the transmission upon death of IP interests to that of tradi-
tional property.59 These views, largely accepted by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee,60 were challenged by a number of scholars as a basis for 
prolonging copyright duration.61 Indeed, scholars have generally taken 
a skeptical eye toward postmortem copyrights. Zechariah Chafee dis-
tinguished between pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects, seeing a 
stronger case for the former.62 Paul Saint-Amour eloquently described 
“the long-standing tradition of glorifying postmortem copyright as an 
estate authors may bequeath to their heirs.”63 On that front, he wrote 
critically about the way in which postmortem copyrights function to 
“make the author feel immortal before death” or to “delineate a kind of 
mourning period.”64 
Nevertheless, these arguments and counterarguments often focus 
on the discrete issue of whether the postmortem term should be ex-
tended, rather than on its very existence. Where they have addressed 
the underlying concept, they have not fully engaged with the broader 
succession law context. By contrast, this Article responds to recent ob-
jections to a postmortem term65 by taking a concentrated look at that 
issue against the backdrop of entrenched succession law principles. It 
proceeds on the assumption that copyright interests are sufficiently 
comparable to traditional property interests to permit the post-death 
treatment of the latter to be used at least as a basis for discussing the 
                                                                                                                  
57. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
58. See, e.g., Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing 
on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual 
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 233, 240 (1995) (statement of Quincy 
Jones); see also The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 43 (1995) (statement of Alan Menken). 
59. See Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on 
H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 272 (1995) (prepared statement of Mary Ellin 
Barrett, daughter of Irving Berlin); The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on 
S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 64–65 (1995) (prepared statement 
of Shana Alexander, daughter of Milton Ager).  
60. See S. REP. NO. 104–315, at 10 (1996) (“[T]he Committee concludes that the majority 
of American creators anticipate that their copyrights will serve as important sources of income 
for their children and through them into the succeeding generation.”); see also id. at 12 (“One 
of the reasons why people exert themselves to earn money or acquire property is to leave a 
legacy to their children and grandchildren.”). 
61. See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
62. See Chafee, supra note 16, at 725. 
63. SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 56, at 122. 
64. Id. at 128, 154. 
65. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.  
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former.66 Importantly, as has been demonstrated by the third wave of 
property scholarship,67 this conceptual move need not signify an expan-
sion of rights. 
III. CONTOURS OF COPYRIGHT’S POSTMORTEM TERM 
It is no exaggeration to state that there has been a centuries-long 
debate over the ideal copyright term. Not surprisingly, the issue of du-
ration usually comes to the fore when a proposal to amend the then-
current term is floated.68 Advocates for postmortem rights typically ar-
gue that such rights provide additional incentives to undertake creative 
work.69 And indeed, the term of federal copyright protection has con-
tinually grown in length.70 This Part briefly traces the expansion of the 
copyright term to include a lengthy postmortem component. It then out-
lines some distinctions between the exploitation of copyright during the 
life, and following the death, of the author.  
A. Evolution of Duration of Copyright Protection 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant exclusive, 
time-limited rights in written works to “Authors.”71 This authorization 
to benefit authors (themselves) could be seen as a textual prohibition 
on any postmortem period of protection, although it has never been 
construed that way. Modeled on the British Statute of Anne,72 the 
United States’s first copyright statute of 1790 provided for a fourteen-
year initial term that was measured from the date the title was recorded 
                                                                                                                  
66. See Van Houweling, supra note 44, at 5 (“[T]he law of tangible property can be an 
important source of insights about the benefits and costs of granting people rights to con-
trol . . . valuable resources, and about the various ways those rights and corresponding reme-
dies can be structured. Copyright law . . . stands to benefit from these insights.”). 
67. See supra notes 43–45. 
68. See RICKETSON, supra note 5, at 322–23. 
69. See, e.g., MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM: A WRITER’S MANIFESTO 45 (2009) 
(arguing that a lengthy or even perpetual postmortem term would provide “an incentive to 
every author to strive for timelessness and greatness”). 
70. It is true, however, that the 1976 federal Copyright Act actually limited what had been 
perpetual state law protection for two types of works — unpublished works and pre-1972 
sound recordings. For a discussion of these changes, see Eva E. Subotnik & June M. Besek, 
Constitutional Obstacles? Reconsidering Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Record-
ings, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 327, 330, 351 (2014). 
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
72. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 11 (1710) (Gr. Brit.); see Lionel Bently & Jane C. 
Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Re-
version Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1475, 1549 (2010) (tracing the relationship). 
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with a designated clerk’s office.73 If the author survived the term, he 
was entitled to an additional fourteen-year renewal term.74 With the en-
actment of the 1909 Copyright Act, the term was extended to an initial 
term of twenty-eight years, measured from the date of first publication, 
plus an additional renewal term — not contingent on the author’s sur-
vival — of twenty-eight years.75 One reason for this extension was to 
ensure the possibility of at least lifetime ownership of copyrights by 
authors.76 
As part of the copyright law revisions that culminated in the 1976 
Copyright Act, as originally enacted, Congress made three important 
and relevant changes. First, it extended copyright protection to all 
works upon their fixation in a tangible medium of expression (rather 
than upon their publication), leading to exponential growth in the num-
ber of copyrighted works.77 Second, it provided that copyright interests 
were thereafter divisible into an infinite number of strands; for exam-
ple, the rights to publish, perform, or adapt a work could each be sepa-
rately owned.78 Third, it revised the general term of protection so that 
it would be pegged to the life of the author (specifically, it would last 
for the life of the author plus fifty years), rather than to the date of first 
publication.79  
The legislative history reflects several reasons for the last change, 
such as ensuring that all of an author’s works enter the public domain 
at the same time and avoiding fraught decisions about whether and 
when a work was first published.80 The change also harmonized U.S. 
                                                                                                                  
73. The term was measured from “the time of recording the title thereof in the clerk’s of-
fice” of the “district court where the author or proprietor shall reside.” An Act for the Encour-
agement of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and 
Proprietors of Such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned, 1 Stat. 124, ch. XV, §§ 1, 
3 (1790). 
74. Id. at § 1.  
75. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 35 Stat. 1075, ch. 
320, §§ 23, 24 (1909). In the interim, Congress had extended copyright duration to a twenty-
eight year initial term that was renewable for an additional fourteen years. An Act to Amend 
the Several Acts Respecting Copy Rights, 4 Stat. 436, ch. 16, §§ 1, 2 (1831). 
76. R. Anthony Reese, Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives 
on Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 722 (1995). 
77. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Although the 1976 Copyright Act also initially required that 
each published work provide proper copyright notice, this requirement was dropped (on a 
prospective basis) in order to ensure U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention, which the 
United States joined in 1988. See id. §§ 401–402 (making copyright notice optional); 3 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 6:74 (2015). 
78. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). This constituted a significant deviation from the 1909 Copyright 
Act, which had treated a copyright as “indivisible.” 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01 (rev. ed.) (2015). 
79. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976) (amended 1998).  
80. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 134 (1976); see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(d)–(e) (providing 
mechanisms for dealing with uncertainties in determining an author’s date of death). For a 
detailed review and critique of the reasons behind this legislative shift, see generally Pamela 
Samuelson, Notice Failures Arising From Copyright Duration Rules, B.U. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015). 
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law with the large majority of countries that had adopted the same 
term.81 Most importantly for purposes of this Article, supporters of the 
change felt that the 1909 Act’s “56-year term [was] not long enough to 
insure an author and his dependents the fair economic benefits from his 
works.”82 Since life expectancies had increased, authors were appar-
ently outliving their copyrights and being forced to compete with their 
own works that had fallen into the public domain. Working from the 
premise that “life expectancy in 1909, which was in the neighborhood 
of 56 years, offered a rough guide to the length of copyright protection” 
under the 1909 Act, the 1976 House Report cited increased human lon-
gevity to conclude, arguably as a non sequitur, that a “copyright should 
extend beyond the author’s lifetime.”83 
The structural change effected by the 1976 Act should not be con-
strued to mean that previously there had been no postmortem period of 
protection. Despite increasing life spans throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, a 1909 Act copyright that endured for fifty-six years from publi-
cation easily could have outlasted the work’s creator. Nevertheless, the 
reconfiguration of the term to a “life plus” formulation ensures that 
every copyright will outlast its work’s human author.84  
Tensions over this durational aspect were enhanced by the 1998 
CTEA, which extended the postmortem period from fifty to seventy 
years.85 Once again, the reasons tendered for the amendment included 
international harmonization and the maximization of protection for 
                                                                                                                  
81. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 135. Sam Ricketson has detailed how the international 
standard of a “life plus” formulation was largely a product of deference to continental notions 
of copyrights as full-fledged property rights as opposed to the Anglo-American view of them 
primarily as economic rights. See RICKETSON, supra note 5, at 321, 323. Deven Desai has 
argued that the actual sources of the domestic and international momentum to extend copy-
right beyond the life of the author are less clear than is often thought. Desai, supra note 13, at 
244. 
82. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 134. 
83. Id. at 135. 
84. One possible way to avoid this inevitability is for an author to try to affirmatively ded-
icate her work to the public domain through her will, using instruments such as the Creative 
Commons CC0 waiver. See About CC0 — “No Rights Reserved,” CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://creativecommons.org/about/cc0 [http://perma.cc/H83F-2KCJ]. 
85. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298, § 102, 112 Stat. 
2827, 2827 (1998). Many scholars have addressed the CTEA. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copy-
right and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 410 n.4 (2002) (collecting sources). Many 
were critical both of the justifications for the CTEA tendered by Congress, see, e.g., J.H. 
Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 625, 642 (1996) (critiquing harmonization goals), and of the reasons provided by 
the Supreme Court in upholding the extension, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), 
especially since the extension applied “retroactively” to works already in existence. Raising 
particular concern was evidence suggesting that the extension did not result from (relatively) 
balanced policymaking but from strong-arming by powerful entertainment industry lobbyists. 
See Liu, supra, at 421. 
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U.S. authors in Europe.86 The increase in the average American life 
span was also cited.87  
A number of commentators objected to the lengthy and multi-gen-
erational coverage provided by the CTEA. In testimony before Con-
gress, Peter Jaszi disputed the existence of any entrenched principle in 
U.S. law that “copyright laws would provide a legacy for two genera-
tions of an author’s descendants” which needed to be accommodated in 
the face of increasing life expectancies.88 At most, he pointed out, the 
legislative history accompanying the 1976 Act contemplated economic 
protections only for “an author and his dependents.”89 Nevertheless, 
this round of legislative amendment appeared to validate the principle 
that “authors expect their copyrights to be a potentially valuable re-
source to be passed on to their children and through them into the suc-
ceeding generation.”90 The fifty-year postmortem period was deemed 
inadequate and it gave way to the current term of life of the author plus 
seventy years.  
B. Categorizing the Works Authors Leave Behind 
One problem that arises in assessing postmortem copyrights is that 
copyright attaches to extremely varied types of works.91 Because of the 
changes embodied in the current law, as just described, postmortem 
rights apply to everything from the author’s personal correspondence 
and snapshots to the great American novel that she has left behind.92 
Importantly, and increasingly, the rights also apply to digital works and 
electronic correspondence that the author created, which may be gov-
erned by an elaborate set of licensing terms with the relevant service 
provider as well as by state laws governing the access rights of execu-
tors and successors.93 A rough categorization of works would therefore 
                                                                                                                  
86. See 141 CONG. REC. S3390-02 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) [here-
inafter Hatch Statement]. 
87. Id. 
88. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 71, 74 n.9 (1995) (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi, Wash. Coll. 
of Law, Am. Univ.) [hereinafter Jaszi Statement]; accord Copyright Term, Film Labeling, 
and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 290 (1995) (statement of Professor Dennis S. Karjala, Ariz. State Univ.) [hereinafter 
Karjala Statement]. 
89. Jaszi Statement, supra note 88 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 134 (1976)). 
90. Hatch Statement, supra note 86. 
91. For a discussion of the uniformity costs associated with an IP regime that applies to a 
multiplicity of works and uses of works, see, for example, Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does 
Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 
1389 (2009). 
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (defining wide breadth of copyrightable subject matter). 
93. See Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 
NAT. ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’Y J. 135, 140 (2013); Sandi S. Varnado, Your Digital Footprint 
Left Behind at Death: An Illustration of Technology Leaving the Law Behind, 74 LA. L. REV. 
92  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 29 
 
facilitate a more refined evaluation of the justifications for postmortem 
rights.  
 Unpublished while 
author is alive 
Published while 
author is alive 
Interest in work by 
public (preserva-
tion for cultural 




Interest in work by 
author’s family or 
friends 
B D 
Figure 1: Interest, Publication, and Postmortem Rights 
In the upper left-hand quadrant (A) are works that remain un-
published by the author at her death that might be of interest to a user 
for purposes of preserving the work or for purposes of self-expression. 
Examples are an author’s diary or correspondence that a scholar wants 
to use in order to produce a biography, or a conceptual artist’s use of 
an author’s letters as part of a multimedia exhibit. In the lower left-hand 
quadrant (B) are unpublished works that are purely of interest to the 
author’s family members or friends. For, most people, a decedent’s let-
ters, email or snapshots will fall into this category. Importantly, with 
respect to both quadrants (A) and (B), ownership of the only physical 
object embodying the intangible work of authorship, such as a diary, 
may devolve to the same person who inherits the copyright in that 
work — for example, because both assets pass through the author’s re-
siduary clause, or through intestacy, to the same person(s). In such 
cases, the successor will be able to control the copyright as well as ac-
cess to the sole surviving copies of the work. 
In the upper right-hand quadrant (C) are works that were published 
while the author was alive that might be of interest to a user for pur-
poses of preservation or self-expression. Examples are an author’s pub-
lished short stories for use in a new anthology or in a biography; the 
mounting of a production of an author’s published play with a tradi-
tional or all-female cast; or the use of an author’s published book in 
                                                                                                                  
719, 747 (2014). See generally Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81 
TEMP. L. REV. 67 (2008); Jason Mazzone, The Right To Die Online, 16 J. INTERNET L. 1 
(2013).  
No. 1] Copyright and the Living Dead 93 
 
order to make a film adaptation. Finally, in the lower right-hand quad-
rant (D) are published works that are purely of interest to an author’s 
family members or friends, such as a book of poetry self-published dec-
ades earlier.  
A few caveats must be stated about this table. Clearly, some uses 
of a work will implicate more than one quadrant, which reflects one of 
the central problems of setting copyright policy. For example, a work 
can be of interest both to the author’s family and to some segment of 
the public. Furthermore, a work can migrate between quadrants over 
time. An obscure, out-of-print book may begin as the subject of interest 
to the author’s family but, over time, garner the attention of a scholar 
with an interest in that literary niche. In addition, there are many other 
considerations that could be factored into a multi-vectored categoriza-
tion of works, such as whether a work — or interest in using the 
work — is commercially valuable in nature. Finally, it is important to 
note that many “works” will fall outside of the grid entirely. That is, a 
huge number of works — perhaps the vast majority — are of no interest 
to anyone. The journals, post-it reminders, college-era notebooks, etc. 
that most of us leave behind will constitute copyright-protected detritus 
to be carted away in order for the living to move on. Nevertheless, the 
characteristics identified in this table should facilitate a more refined 
evaluation of copyright’s postmortem term. 
C. Distinction Between Lifetime and Post-Death Exploitation 
There is clearly no more consequential event in a person’s life than 
his or her own death. As great as the impact of death is on an author 
and her family, however, certain features of the copyright story may 
change while others may not. From an economic standpoint, after a 
successful (or moderately successful) author has died, the biggest 
change is that she can no longer create new works; her oeuvre is now 
complete, even if certain works are not yet known to exist by her agent, 
successors, or the public because she kept them in draft form. Moreo-
ver, the author can no longer embark on book tours, give interviews, 
write prefaces to new editions, or otherwise promote her body of work. 
Countering these effects may be a temporary surge of interest in an au-
thor’s work following her death that generates economic returns.94 
From a rights management perspective, certain aspects may not 
change at all. Rights are often assigned or licensed by an author during 
his or her lifetime. This is likely to be the case for the most successful 
works — works falling into quadrant (C) above.95 Book publishers, for 
                                                                                                                  
94. See, e.g., Interview with Jeffrey Posternak, The Wylie Agency LLC (June 30, 2014) 
(on file with author). 
95. See, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 5, at 320–21. 
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example, are granted publication rights and, for commercially success-
ful works, they will continue to exploit the rights after the author’s 
death just as they did beforehand. If the author assigned the rights for a 
lump sum, there will be no difference whatsoever; if the author retained 
a royalty stream, then the only difference will be in who receives the 
royalties. Furthermore, with respect to many published works — in-
cluding works falling into quadrant (D) above — the death of the author 
may not change anything as a practical matter: for works that retain 
only infinitesimal economic value after an initial run in the market-
place, there may be no interest in exploiting the copyrights even before 
the author has died.96  
And yet, in some circumstances, there will be concrete differences. 
A living author can exploit the copyrights that she still owns in ways 
that promote her own vision and interpretation of her work. For exam-
ple, Erica Jong can decide for herself whether the protagonist of her 
classic Fear of Flying, Isadora Wing, should be reprised in a new 
work — or whether that character should merely make a cameo appear-
ance, as she apparently decided.97 Such ownership will exist with re-
spect to rights that were never assigned, including but not limited to 
rights in unpublished works, or rights that were licensed only on a non-
exclusive basis.98 An author will also own rights that were initially as-
signed but have subsequently reverted to her because she has either 
terminated the assignments pursuant to her statutory rights99 or has oth-
erwise reacquired them.100  
                                                                                                                  
96. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254–55 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
MADOFF, supra note 21, at 144 (citing congressional testimony of Samuel Clemens, a.k.a. 
Mark Twain, to the effect that, just like the hypothetical problem of twenty-child families, the 
problem of long copyright duration tends to take care of itself for most works). 
97. Alexandra Alter, Boldly Defying the Sunset of Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015, at C1. 
That said, it must be acknowledged that living authors, despite remaining right holders, may 
not always have the capacity to exercise such choice. The fanfare and controversy over the 
recent release of Harper Lee’s second novel brought this possibility to the fore. See Adam 
Gopnik, Sweet Home Alabama: Harper Lee’s “Go Set a Watchman,” NEW YORKER (July 27, 
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/27/sweet-home-alabama 
[http://perma.cc/44MH-CR92] (discussing the book’s “mysterious provenance”). 
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (barring nonexclusive licenses from the definition of 
“transfer of copyright ownership”). 
99. See id. §§ 203, 304(c)–(d) (setting out statutory rights to terminate assignments and 
licenses after specified period of time has elapsed). 
100. For example, some publishing contracts specify that if a work remains out of print for 
a specified period, the rights revert to the author — though not automatically. Nicole Cabrera 
et al., Understanding Rights Reversion: When, Why, & How To Regain Copyright and Make 
Your Book More Available, AUTHORS ALLIANCE 42–49 (2015), http://www.authorsalli-
ance.org/2015/04/09/keeping-your-books-available [http://perma.cc/E87J-HVJC] (follow 
“Download Understanding Rights Reversions (PDF)” hyperlink); see also Interview with 
Richard Dannay (May 23, 2014) (on file with author); “Out of Print” Clauses, COLUM. L. 
SCH., http://web.law.columbia.edu/keep-your-copyrights/copyrights/out-of-print-clauses 
[http://perma.cc/322N-6LDJ]. 
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Control over these rights — which can cover a great swath of eco-
nomically valuable material — will pass from the author to her succes-
sors after death. These successors may not have played any role in the 
creation of the underlying work itself, or have any particular relation-
ship to it, but they are now in a position to control its exploitation and 
adaptation in the marketplace. J.D. Salinger, for example, was fa-
mously iron-fisted with respect to the use of his work.101 The creative 
and economic choices that were his are now in the hands of others — 
successors in the form of trustees.102  
Even with respect to rights that have been assigned away, there 
may be differences between pre- and post-death exploitation. Over 
time, an assignee may have arrived at an established understanding with 
an author about the exploitation of a work, which may bear on an au-
thor’s exercise of statutory termination rights.103 An author’s succes-
sors to these rights,104 by contrast, may enter the picture and try to 
recalibrate the relationship in ways that deviate from the author’s ex-
pectations.  
Given the existence of at least some tangible differences between 
the exploitation of copyrights during the life and following the death of 
the author, it remains to consider the justifications under succession law 
for the postmortem copyright term.  
IV. SUCCESSION LAW JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE POSTMORTEM 
TERM 
Many justifications have been advanced in support of a basic prin-
ciple of testamentary freedom.105 This Part focuses primarily on three: 
utilitarian theories, natural rights theories, and intelligent estate plan-
ning theories. While each justification has its detractors, the overriding 
                                                                                                                  
101. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger v. Random 
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92–94 (2d Cir. 1987).  
102. For an exploration of these issues, see Kate O’Neill, Copyright Law and the Manage-
ment of J.D. Salinger’s Literary Estate, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (2012). 
103. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c)–(d) (2012). Copyright law affords specific opportunities 
that no longer exist following the death of the author. The ability to grant rights that may be 
statutorily recaptured at the end of a thirty-five-year window will cease, since such recapture 
opportunities are available only when the living author has executed the grants. See id. 
§ 203(a) (providing for the termination of grants made by the author other than an author’s 
grants by will). Grants that an author previously made while still alive are capable of being 
terminated after her death by her statutory heirs. Id. § 203(a)(2). In addition, certain moral 
rights provided by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 — such as the right to claim author-
ship of, and to prevent the intentional distortion or mutilation of, works of visual art — may 
also be available only for the life of the author. Id. § 106A(d)(1). The lifetime cap on protec-
tion of these rights exists only with respect to newly created works of visual art. Id. 
104. In general, authors cannot choose these statutory successors in the same way that they 
can bequeath their copyrights and physical copies of their works. See, e.g., id. § 203(a)(2)(D) 
(allowing such choice only where the “author’s widow or widower, children, and grandchil-
dren are not living” at the relevant time period).  
105. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
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question in the present context is whether any given theory should op-
erate differently when the object of transmission is a copyright rather 
than a traditional property interest.  
One more note before proceeding. Any discussion of testamentary 
freedom requires an initial distinction between an owner’s rights to 
transmit property to the recipients of her choosing and her rights to 
transmit property at all (that is, to avoid its confiscation by the state) — 
or between what Adam Hirsch and William Wang term the right of tes-
tation and the right of inheritance.106 In practice, most jurisdictions to-
day afford both rights, but with some limitations.107  
A. Utilitarian Theories  
Support for a system of testamentary freedom — whether one fo-
cuses on the right of testation or of inheritance — is often based on 
utilitarian goals of promoting happiness. In its simplest incarnation, the 
intuition is that the ability to leave property to the persons of one’s 
choosing provides a sense of comfort and happiness.108 Testamentary 
freedom has also been viewed as an “inducement to industry and 
thrift.”109 Jeremy Bentham, for example, framed the benefits in terms 
of the utility that comes both from allowing people to provide for those 
to whom they feel attached, as well as from the discouragement of 
wasteful lifetime spending.110 Such incentives promote wealth maximi-
zation — a gauge of utility maximization for some111 — since individ-
uals have reasons to accumulate wealth over and above that which is 
needed during their own lifetimes.112 Other commentators have focused 
                                                                                                                  
106. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 
IND. L.J. 1, 6 n.16 (1992). A jurisdiction could restrict the former but provide for the latter by 
developing fixed rules of succession regardless of testamentary intent. Likewise, a jurisdiction 
could restrict the latter but provide for the former by taxing the transmission of some property 
at death but permitting the rest to pass according to the testator’s expressed intent. Id.  
107. For example, virtually every state will override the right of testation to secure an in-
heritance for a surviving spouse. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 511 (9th ed. 2013). Likewise, the imposition of any level of estate tax 
constitutes a form of government confiscation — a restriction of the right of inheritance.  
108. Halbach, supra note 47, at 5. 
109. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 96–97 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) 
(1891); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 
(2004); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 106, at 7–8 (tracing this theory as far back as the thir-
teenth-century English jurist Henry de Bracton). 
110. See BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, supra note 33, at 336–38. 
111. The merits of wealth maximization as a normative goal have been much debated over 
the past few decades. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) 
(defending such a view); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 
(1980) (attacking such a view). 
112. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465, 471 (1971) 
(“The first consequence of the enactment of . . . a [100%] confiscatory inheritance tax would 
simply be that motives for accumulating capital would be much lower than otherwise.”).  
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more explicitly on the related notion that testamentary freedom gener-
ates a more productive citizenry, since individuals have motivations not 
just to save, but also to produce wealth in the first place.113  
There are, however, costs associated with a policy of deference to 
testamentary intent. Such a system gives priority to the distributive 
wishes of the dead — who are thereby said to have power but not re-
sponsibility114 — over the preferred allocation and management of 
property by the living, potentially leading to inefficiencies. In addition, 
society as a whole arguably incurs a cost to the extent it collects only 
limited estate tax revenues.115 Furthermore, across generations, such a 
policy may perpetuate and entrench class disparities, a prospect that 
many find pernicious,116 especially in a nation that affirmatively re-
jected systems of nobility.117 
For these reasons, some commentators contend that the utilitarian 
justification for testamentary freedom fails because the benefits do not 
outweigh the costs. It has been argued, for example, that individuals 
may have many reasons to generate and accumulate wealth beyond 
what is needed during their lifetimes, such as their desire for prestige 
or power, their internal wiring, or other non-testamentary motives.118 
Moreover, to the extent that an ability to direct wealth at death means 
the enrichment of the living, such ability can theoretically lead to un-
derproductive individuals in the next generation, undermining the util-
itarian calculation.119 Nevertheless, utilitarian theories remain a 
powerful driver of succession law policy. 
In some respects, the utilitarian basis for testamentary freedom 
matches up well with the ostensible philosophy behind IP rights — that 
is, the maximization of social welfare by stimulating the production and 
                                                                                                                  
113. See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 47, at 5–6. 
114. Austin W. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead. II., 65 U. PA. L. REV. 632, 657 
(1917). 
115. See POSNER, supra note 33, at 703–04 (characterizing the federal estate tax, which 
generates only approximately 1% of federal taxes collected, as a weak generator of the federal 
government’s revenue). 
116. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 87–91 
(1990). For John Rawls, wealth transfer taxes are justified primarily as a check on unequal 
concentrations of wealth and power that thwart key principles of justice like fair equality of 
opportunity, rather than as a revenue generator for the government. See JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (Harvard Univ. Press 2005) (1971). But see Edward J. McCaffery, 
The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 293 (1994) (contending 
that liberal egalitarian political theory, particularly that of Rawls, actually favors the abolition 
of such taxes).  
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
118. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 116, at 100; see also JOSIAH WEDGWOOD, THE 
ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE 215–16, 232 (Ralph Adams Brown ed., 3d ed. 1971) (1929). 
This objection also finds substantial resonance in the IP context. See, e.g., Eva E. Subotnik, 
Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935, 960–61 n.134 (2014). 
119. See Ascher, supra note 116, at 99; Hirsch & Wang, supra note 106, at 9. 
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distribution of creative works that might not otherwise be under-
taken120 — including the provision of postmortem copyrights. While 
the need to avoid tragedy of the commons problems post-death is 
clearly different when addressing IP,121 the perceived need for upfront 
incentives is similar. And, taken at face value, the proposition that cop-
yrights should last for life but simply evaporate upon an author’s death 
would wreak havoc on the ability to exploit those rights economically, 
raising the problems that generally afflict life estates.122 This is because 
the timing of one’s death is usually an uncertainty.123 Arguments in fa-
vor of limiting copyright to life alone124 seem to take for granted that 
most authorship is conducted by the young or middle-aged who can 
expect to live decades more.  
By contrast, postmortem protection — like a policy of testamen-
tary freedom more generally — would appear to encourage authors of 
all ages and levels of health to invest in creative projects by holding out 
the consolation prize that they may provide for their loved ones after 
death.125 Furthermore, as mentioned above, many copyright interests 
are assigned to others — publishers and other distributors — in order 
to exploit their value in an efficient manner. Armed only with actuarial 
tables, or with certain non-copyright tools,126 some distributors might 
be willing to invest in the distribution of creative works without a post-
mortem term, but many others would likely hesitate.127 Presumably for 
similar reasons, patent rights do not cease upon the inventor’s death.128 
Nevertheless, the application of utilitarian justifications for testa-
mentary freedom to the case of postmortem copyrights is worth a closer 
                                                                                                                  
120. E.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, 
in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169 (Stephen R. 
Munzer ed., 2001); cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & 
COM. 509, 515 (1996). 
121. Much more could and should be said about what value, if any, is provided by copy-
right successors with respect to the management of copyrighted works. It is an issue I plan to 
address in subsequent work on the stewardship of IP. See infra Part V.B. 
122. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 107, at 397.  
123. There are hybrid solutions for addressing the unknowable length of life. For example, 
one can grant a lifetime term but also provide, as an alternative, a guaranteed minimum term 
of years of protection, as the British copyright acts of 1814 and 1842 did. See, e.g., Bently, 
supra note 20, at 67, 71.  
124. See, e.g., Desai, supra note 13, at 271 (“History and theory support a life term.”). 
125. Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 453, 474–75 (1981) (“The survival of copyrights ensures that the prospect of imminent 
death will not eliminate the financial incentive for . . . ‘late-life’ works.”). 
126. The usual suspects could include a sufficient first-mover advantage or technological 
protection measure. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 41–50 (2003).  
127. But see generally Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 
52 HOUS. L. REV. 613 (2014) (arguing that copyright’s primary concern is stimulating crea-
tivity not dissemination). 
128. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). Of course, the patent term is structured quite dif-
ferently from the copyright term. 
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look because of arguable vulnerabilities on two fronts. From one per-
spective, the strength of the postmortem term as a motivating force is 
debatable. Specifically, it is unknown how many authors are actually 
driven to create by the prospect that their works will not only be suc-
cessful in the short run but also will produce a post-death economic 
legacy.129 From the other side, it is possible that the postmortem term 
may exert too strong a motivating force. That is, if wealth maximization 
and the preservation of capital are the hoped-for goals of testamentary 
rights, then such goals are arguably incompatible with copyright policy, 
which is aimed at encouraging the investment of time and resources 
into authorship — an activity whose odds of large financial payout have 
been likened to winning the lottery.130  
These lines of argument, however, may ask too much. Taken to-
gether, they are somewhat contradictory. If the system of incentives is 
weak, then there is little reason to worry about an excessive entry prob-
lem. But even taking each line of critique separately, neither is suffi-
ciently at odds with utilitarian theories to warrant a total cessation of 
postmortem rights on those grounds.  
1. Are Postmortem Rights Too Weak?  
As with the debate over the post-death transmission of property 
more generally,131 there is insufficient evidence about whether the in-
centives offered by the copyright regime are fully effective or optimally 
tailored.132 In addition, many protectable “works,” such as letters, 
email, or touristy snapshots (works that fall into quadrant (B) in the 
chart above — unpublished works purely of interest to the author’s 
                                                                                                                  
129. A number of prominent economists have cast doubt on the additional incentive effects 
of an extraordinarily long copyright term upon would-be authors. Brief for George A. Akerlof 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618), 2002 WL 1041846, at *2. 
130. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 9 
(1995) (arguing that “[b]ook publishing is a lottery of the purest sort, with a handful of best-
selling authors receiving more than $10 million per book while armies of equally talented 
writers earn next to nothing”); Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages 
Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 794 
(2004) (arguing that copyright policy “enabl[es] publishers in many current lottery-like con-
tent markets to dramatically increase their revenues from their most popular works and then 
to spend them on promoting those works,” thereby “crowd[ing] out more economically mar-
ginal works”); Nicolas Suzor, Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Cop-
yright, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 297, 304 (2013) (“[T]he lottery that copyright provides, 
rewarding an extremely small proportion of artists highly, suggests that copyright creates se-
vere distributional problems and has serious failures in its inability . . . to provide the financial 
support that professional creators need to pursue their craft.”). 
131. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 33, at 704 (citing lack of consensus among economists 
on the relative influence of the bequest motive in wealth accumulation); Hirsch & Wang, 
supra note 106, at 9 n.28 (noting a similar lack of consensus). 
132. Jessica Silbey and others are trying to address this lacuna. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE 
EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 
(2014) (seeking such evidence from series of qualitative studies). 
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family members or friends) are usually created without any thought of 
financial remuneration. 
Even with respect to more standard works, however, Justice Ste-
phen Breyer and others have expressed doubt about the influence that 
a desire to provide for one’s descendants exerts on authors.133 But 
Breyer’s critique was principally aimed at the length of the postmortem 
term, rather than at its very existence.134 Furthermore, the claim that 
authors are not likely motivated by the thought of their great-grandchil-
dren is a different proposition from the claim that they are not likely 
motivated by a desire to provide for their children.135 That is, even ac-
cepting that a seventy-year postmortem period is excessive as a driving 
force does not necessarily render any post-death period of protection 
useless in that regard.  
In fact, succession law default rules are replete with the insight that 
most people do wish to provide for their children. For example, if a 
parent inadvertently leaves a child out of his will because the child was 
born after its execution, the child typically will still be entitled to share 
in the parent’s estate.136 Such an inferred level of care even extends to 
multiple generations of one’s descendants. Intestacy laws, which have 
evolved over time to reflect the presumed intent of the average dece-
dent,137 do not cap the generational distance between decedents and 
their lineal heirs.138 One might challenge the relevance of these two ex-
amples, however, since they apply only when a decedent has not fully 
or effectively expressed her intentions through a will, perhaps indicat-
ing that she was not driven toward a productive life by concerns about 
                                                                                                                  
133. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (“[E]ven if . . . some potential author might be moved 
by the thought of great-grandchildren receiving copyright royalties . . . so might some poten-
tial author also be moved by . . . royalties being paid for two centuries, five centuries, 1,000 
years, ’til the End of Time. And from a rational economic perspective the time difference 
among these periods makes no real difference.”). 
134. His dissent arose out of the congressional extension of the copyright term by twenty 
years. Id. at 243. 
135. Cf. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees 
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1193 (1970) (“It seems most unlikely 
that an author, assured of the economic fruits of his labor for his own lifetime, that of his 
children, and perhaps also his grandchildren, would elect not to engage in creative efforts 
because his posterity in perpetuity would not also so benefit.”). 
136. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2 (McKinney 2014); UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-302(a) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 
amended 2010). 
137. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 107, at 63. Others emphasize that in-
testacy laws are aimed to ensure the welfare of close surviving family members. See Tritt, 
supra note 47, at 133; see also Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Com-
peting Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 
285 (2010) (arguing that decedent intent should be the governing principle in the contexts of 
both testacy and intestacy). 
138. All lineal descendants, no matter how remote, are eligible to inherit as long as there 
is no intervening surviving descendant. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-
1.1(a)(1), (3) (McKinney 2014); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(1). 
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her descendants — near or remote. But such a view may overly dis-
count the fact that approximately half of all decedents rely upon default 
intestacy schemes as their method of distribution.139  
For even stronger evidence of longstanding interest in providing 
for one’s descendants, one can turn to the patterns of donative behavior 
that gave rise to the Rule Against Perpetuities (“RAP”), which is still 
operative in some form in the majority of states.140 The RAP is said to 
reflect society’s distaste for the long-term fragmentation of property 
strands that results in the inalienability of the full parcel (especially in 
the case of land). It also reduces agency costs by shortening the period 
of separation of control and beneficial ownership (especially in the case 
of trusts).141  
The RAP operates by preventing a testator (or living donor) from 
transferring property interests that may vest too far in the future and, 
thereby, from exercising control over remote descendants.142 The very 
need for the RAP arose, however, because individual decedents at-
tempted to do just that: to provide for multiple generations of their de-
scendants by micro-managing the vesting of interests over time, often 
through so-called dynasty trusts,143 rather than by leaving the property 
outright to their children. This impulse has gained traction in recent 
years with the increasing curtailment, or abolition, of the RAP in those 
                                                                                                                  
139. Tritt, supra note 137, at 293. This is true even if, as Lee-ford Tritt argues, “it is falla-
cious to assume that all individuals without wills have consciously chosen the intestate distri-
bution scheme.” Id. at 285. 
140. See generally The Rule Against Perpetuities: A Survey of State (and D.C.) Law, AM. 
COLL. TR. & EST. COUNS., http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/Studies/ 
Zaritsky_RAP_Survey_03_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/H58Q-Q6ZT].  
141. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2106 (2003) (assembling tra-
ditional justifications for the RAP adduced by courts and scholars). Scholars have offered 
alternative, yet compatible, justifications for the RAP. Stewart Sterk argues that the RAP 
stands in opposition to trusts that produce agency costs and externalities without correspond-
ing benefits. See id. at 2117. Daniel Kelly justifies the RAP’s interference with donor intent 
as a corrective that reflects the reality that dispositions are made with imperfect information. 
Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1158, 1182 (2013). 
142. For the classic formulation at common law, see, for example, JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, 
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942) (“No interest 
is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at 
the creation of the interest.”); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 
638, 639 (1938) (same).  
143. It is true that the prospect of establishing these sorts of trusts did not necessarily mo-
tivate industriousness, since trusts could also be established to distribute previously inherited 
wealth. The point is that the perceived need for the RAP reflected an apparently widespread 
interest of individuals in providing for remote descendants. Much more recently, the federal 
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax addresses this same desire of individuals. In brief, the 
GST tax provides that wealth transfers be taxed at least once per generation. See I.R.C. § 2601 
and the provisions that follow. (2012).  
102  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 29 
 
states competing to cater to families desirous of creating perpetual 
trusts.144  
Further, policies underlying the RAP do not undermine postmor-
tem copyrights.145 To begin with, the RAP is concerned not with long-
term ownership per se but rather with the uncertain vesting of owner-
ship too far into the future. In many cases, as will be discussed below,146 
the various copyright strands that have been bequeathed will be vested 
interests; they will simply be owned for long stretches of time following 
an author’s death. In addition, an important idea animating the RAP is 
to render the full parcel of property once again marketable. But the goal 
of marketability contrasts to some extent with a policy of eliminating 
copyright interests at the author’s death: the elimination of the postmor-
tem term would result in the cessation of exclusive ownership rights 
altogether.147 In such a case, the intangible work — assuming users 
could put their hands on available copies — would become fully avail-
able for copying and adaptation by anyone.148  
Even equating full marketability of the intangible work with its en-
try into the public domain, however, the time frame associated with the 
RAP would not require an end to postmortem copyright interests. The 
RAP period reflects a common law sentiment that a donor should be 
able to tie up property interests for no longer than the life of anyone she 
                                                                                                                  
144. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 141, at 2103 (describing phenomenon of competition to 
lure the trust business to their states); see also Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, 
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 
115 YALE L.J. 356, 412 (2005) (finding that “through 2003, the movement to abolish the 
[RAP] has affected the situs of $100 billion in reported trust assets — roughly 10% of the 
2003 total”). 
145. For one thing, in those jurisdictions where it is in force, the RAP will presumably 
operate on copyright interests as on other property interests. 
146. See infra Part V.A. 
147. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892 (2012) (“Once the term of protection 
ends, the works do not revest in any rightholder. Instead, the works simply lapse into the 
public domain. . . .”). In other words, under the RAP, invalid interests do not escheat to the 
state; rather, a revised distribution among the donor’s named beneficiaries or other successors 
takes place. 
148. Some economists would likely view the cessation of ownership rights to reduce mar-
ketability in this context. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewa-
ble Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 488–89 (2003). Others, however, would likely 
disagree. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When 
Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2013); Paul J. Heald, Does the Song Remain the Same? An 
Empirical Study of Bestselling Musical Compositions (1913–1932) and Their Use in Cinema 
(1968–2007), 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2009); Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the 
Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and 
Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2008); see also Gordon, supra 
note 127, at 623 n.27 (“Unlike tangibles, . . . works of authorship need not be owned by any 
one person or entity to be used efficiently and well; often common ownership (‘public do-
main’ status) is the most productive status.”). 
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possibly knows plus the next generation’s minority.149 By some calcu-
lations, this results in a time limit of roughly one hundred years.150 
Moreover, about half the states have now adopted some version of the 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP).151 The USRAP 
combines a wait-and-see period of ninety years with an authorization 
for courts to reform interests that have not yet vested.152 Under any of 
these timelines, a postmortem period of copyright protection lasting 
seventy years is not unseemly. One countervailing consideration, how-
ever, is that these comparisons do not take into account the antemortem 
portion of the copyright term. For example, copyright protection will 
last 140 years when an author creates a work at age twenty and dies at 
age ninety. From that perspective, the full term of protection — during 
life and post-death — is longer than the perpetuities period. Neverthe-
less, for the other reasons just discussed, mere ownership for a lengthy 
period of time does not violate the spirit, let alone letter, of the RAP.  
Longstanding succession law principles thus suggest that individ-
uals are motivated to amass wealth by concerns about the next genera-
tion(s). Those principles, in turn, furnish at least some basis for 
postmortem copyrights that last for a period of time following an au-
thor’s death. These principles are less persuasive, however, with re-
spect to the many “works” that are created without any plausible 
expectation of financial return. 
2. Are Postmortem Rights Too Strong?  
From the opposite perspective, some may argue that a postmortem 
copyright term is socially harmful if it encourages additional entry into 
creative fields rather than into more reliably lucrative pursuits.153 Taken 
to its logical conclusion, concerns about excessive entry into creative 
fields might counsel against any copyright protection at all, even for a 
                                                                                                                  
149. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 144, at 364. 
150. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 107, at 880. 
151. Legislative Fact Sheet — Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Statutory%20Rule% 
20Against%20Perpetuities [http://perma.cc/X4HV-Y5NK] (listing enacting jurisdictions as 
of 2014). 
152. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 1(a)(2), 3 (NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 1990). There was some debate over the choice 
of ninety years as the applicable wait-and-see period. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Waggoner, The 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 
73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162 (1988) (arguing that the period approximates actual measuring 
lives plus an additional twenty-one years). 
153. Cf. FRANK & COOK, supra note 130, at 109 (“If the least talented contestants were to 
drop out and become engineers, teachers, or production workers, the performance levels of 
the top performers in winner-take-all markets would not fall by much, if at all.”); JAMES 
BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 11 (2008) (“For most 
works, the owners expect to make all the money they are going to recoup from the work with 
five or ten years of exclusive rights. The rest of the copyright term is . . . a kind of lottery 
ticket in case the work proves to be a one-in-a-million perennial favorite.”). 
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more limited period of time. While this view may have its adherents, 
the real question for present purposes is whether postmortem copyright 
protection completely undercuts wealth maximization goals, and it is 
not clear that it does.  
First, it is certainly possible that the (often irrational) hope of being 
the exception to the rule — that is, of being the fortunate author whose 
work generates large revenues during life and after death — contributes 
to the hard creative work that results in the occasional big financial 
payout.154 Second, even if the odds of a blockbuster payout from any 
given work are slim, many authors and artists rely upon whatever mod-
est revenues their works do yield to supplement, if not fully supply, 
their income streams. That is, even if the astronomically successful ex-
ploitation of any particular book is rare,155 some books, photographs, 
musical works, etc. can continue to generate worthwhile returns over 
time, especially since today’s technology allows for the exploitation of 
the long tail. For example, many photographers deposit their photo-
graphs with stock photo agencies in exchange for royalty payments 
over time. Even if that income stream is modest, it may well supplement 
the author’s and, afterward, her child’s income beyond what other pur-
suits would have yielded.156 And, such individuals may not be able to 
readily convert those royalty streams into lump-sum cash payments that 
could instead be passed on to successors.157  
As with utilitarian theories of testamentary freedom more gener-
ally,158 the effects of the postmortem term of copyright may also be 
critiqued at the level of the next generation. Specifically, in those rela-
tively rare cases where copyrights maintain substantial value for ex-
tended periods of time, it is possible that authors’ successors will 
simply kick up their heels and collect royalties rather than become pro-
ductive wealth-maximizing citizens in their own right.159 Once again, 
if the copyright system in fact yields more financial disappointment 
                                                                                                                  
154. See Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 73 (2004) (noting that a “lottery ticket that offers a chance at 
superstardom may be worth more to some than a predictable salary in a more stable profes-
sion”); John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 465, 490 n.108 (2005) (“While actual financial rewards go to very few, it is 
possible that the promise and potential of huge financial rewards encourage individuals to 
create art. Thus, like a lottery effect, the promise of huge rewards may still incentivize artistic 
creation.”). 
155. See Desai, supra note 13, at 256. 
156. Interview with Joel L. Hecker, Esq., photography lawyer (May 22, 2014) (on file with 
author).  
157. But cf. Desai, supra note 13, at 256 (suggesting that authors who seek to provide for 
their children “could easily leave money or buy life insurance as a way to provide for heirs”). 
158. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
159. Desai, supra note 13, at 259 (“Unlike authors who labor and pour their being into a 
work, their children and their children’s children simply sit back and collect rent. . . .”); cf. 
Patry, supra note 19, at 927 (arguing that the sole beneficiaries of the CTEA’s extension 
would be authors’ estates and distributors, neither of whom created the works). 
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than payout, then idleness among copyright successors does not consti-
tute a pressing problem. In any event, there is no apparent reason to be 
more concerned about slothfulness among inheritors of copyrights than 
among inheritors in general.  
In sum, there is some theory and evidence to neutralize the argu-
ment that utilitarian theories of testamentary freedom operate too 
strongly as applied to copyright interests. If creative industries were all-
or-nothing in terms of likelihood of financial payout, there might be 
cause for concern. But, given the possibility of modest returns on crea-
tive investments that may extend into the future, the existence of post-
mortem protection as a strand in the copyright bundle does not 
necessarily vitiate wealth maximization goals.  
B. Natural Rights and Labor Theories 
Another venerated theory for testamentary freedom frames it as a 
natural right that is beyond the government’s power to abolish.160 As is 
well rehearsed, John Locke posited the acquisition of property as de-
rived from the rights one has in one’s own person and, by extension, 
from the application of one’s labor to objects in nature.161 Natural rights 
couched in labor theories also serve as a fundamental justification for 
the granting of IP rights.162 At its most basic, IP is thought to involve 
the rigor of the intellect and the adding of social value by an au-
thor163 — investments that are often seen as the basis for a natural right 
in the fruits of one’s mind.164 But even accepting this premise does not 
necessitate, a priori, that IP rights should extend beyond the death of 
the intellectual laborer. Indeed, one might have expected the laborer’s 
property rights to cease upon his death. Interestingly, that was not, ap-
parently, Locke’s view: having acquired property, one could use the 
property during life or transfer it to others, including at death.165  
                                                                                                                  
160. Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 
749 (1984). 
161. LOCKE, supra note 32, TREATISE II § 27. 
162. It should be noted, however, that the transplantation of Lockean justifications for pri-
vate property to IP rights has its detractors. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments 
for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF 
PROPERTY 138, 141 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (arguing that Lockean presumption of 
common property ownership undercuts any justification for strong IP rights). 
163. Hughes, supra note 23, at 305. 
164. See generally Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990). As is often emphasized, however, such justifications 
are secondary to utilitarian justifications. See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 
1232, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013). 
165. This view is not without controversy. Compare Leslie Kendrick, The Lockean Rights 
of Bequest and Inheritance, 17 LEGAL THEORY 145, 165 n.93 (2011) (noting that “[s]ome 
theorists reject outright that Lockean property rights include the right of alienation” and col-
lecting sources), with id. at 165 n.94 (citing opposing views). Kendrick herself concludes that 
“[s]uffice it to say that Locke repeatedly contemplates a right of transfer.” Id. at 165. Discuss-
ing the issue at length, Eric Rakowski provides a helpful explanation: “The essence of this 
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But there is an internal conflict with respect to Locke’s own views 
on the postmortem succession of property that bears on the present dis-
cussion.166 On the one hand, Locke argues that an intrinsic principle of 
self-preservation imposes upon a parent a derivative obligation to sus-
tain the children he has brought into the world.167 Such an obligation 
would seemingly translate into a natural right to inherit by children. On 
the other hand, Locke elsewhere suggests that a right to bequeath prop-
erty should override any rights to inherit by children.168 Resolution of 
this tension is relevant to the existence and scope of postmortem copy-
rights because the former view could suggest that only the children of 
the author have a natural right to inherit copyright interests after the 
parent’s death. 
Jeremy Waldron has tried to resolve these competing notions in 
two ways. First, he downplays Locke’s commitment to a natural right 
of testation.169 Second, he draws out a pair of important distinctions: 
(1) between what is needed by the younger generation and what is sur-
plus, and (2) between the state of nature and civil society. For Waldron, 
a coherent Lockean account of property transmission at death would 
acknowledge that “dependent children of a deceased proprietor [are] 
entitled automatically, as a matter of natural right, to enough out of his 
estate to maintain them.”170 However, “[a]part from the needs of de-
pendents, there are no natural rights of succession.”171  
Under this formulation, in the state of nature, that which is surplus 
(that is, not needed by dependents) should return to the use of all of 
mankind — to the “common stock.” It is only civil society that, for a 
variety of reasons that migrate into utilitarian thinking, affirmatively 
puts in place a full-fledged right of testation.172 This was essentially the 
view of William Blackstone, who also viewed testamentary freedom as 
                                                                                                                  
[libertarian] view is that people have an especially strong claim to property secured through 
their personal exertion and that this claim is sufficiently strong to permit them to give that 
property away, substituting another person’s consumption of that property for their own con-
sumption.” Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the Disembodied Will, 4 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 
91, 111 (2005). 
166. See Kendrick, supra note 165, at 151; J.J. Waldron, Locke’s Account of Inheritance 
and Bequest, 19 J. HIST. PHIL. 39, 40 (1981). 
167. LOCKE, supra note 32, TREATISE I § 88. 
168. Id. at TREATISE I § 87 (emphasis added) (“But if any one had began, and made himself 
a Property in any particular thing . . . that possession, if he dispos’d not otherwise of it by his 
positive Grant, descended Naturally to his Children, and they had a right to succeed to it, and 
possess it.”). Interestingly, neither Jeremy Waldron nor Leslie Kendrick seem to consider the 
possibility that the disposition by positive grant referred to is a lifetime transfer by the parent 
to a third party. 
169. Waldron views a natural right of testation as largely incompatible with Locke’s other 
closely held philosophical commitments. See Waldron, supra note 166, at 44. 
170. Id. at 50. 
171. Id.  
172. Id. at 51 (“The right of bequest occupies at most a secondary position in a Lockean 
theory of property and is always a matter of civil law, never of natural right.”). 
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a creature of civil law to obviate what would otherwise be “endless dis-
turbances.”173 Consistent with this strict reading of the natural law, 
then, copyrights not needed to sustain one’s dependents should termi-
nate and the associated works should enter the public domain.  
Leslie Kendrick agrees with Waldron’s interpretation of Locke — 
that, under natural law principles, a robust right of testation must yield 
to the right of children to inherit from their parents those items of prop-
erty necessary for their sustenance and comfort.174 But, she argues, as 
long as that duty is satisfied, a natural right of testation finds support in 
Locke’s view.175 In particular, such a right is justified under a Lockean 
philosophy in which autonomous individuals formulate and undertake 
long-term pursuits. “Just as acquisition and ownership may further 
these goals, so may a person advance his life projects through transfers, 
as much at death as in life.”176 Kendrick thus ties a natural right of tes-
tation to the promotion of human flourishing, a goal she sees as con-
sistent with Locke’s overall philosophy.177 In this way, Kendrick’s 
interpretation may be partially reconciled with Waldron’s: while she 
firmly grounds a right of testation in natural law, as opposed to the ex-
igencies of civil society, she nevertheless justifies it as a means to a 
desirable end.178 
Nevertheless, Kendrick’s commitment to marshaling support for a 
vigorous right of testation that is framed in natural law terms merits 
consideration. This is because a view of the natural law as guaranteeing, 
at most, a right to inherit by dependents that cannot be overridden has 
had mixed application under U.S. law.  
It is true that longstanding protections for surviving spouses in 
most jurisdictions, which mandate that the survivors receive some fixed 
portion of the deceased spouse’s estate,179 could suggest the validation 
of such a limited natural right with respect to postmortem transfers. 
                                                                                                                  
173. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10–11. For Blackstone, to the extent that 
property rights, including the right to transfer property, were natural, that characterization was 
only true among the living: such rights expired at the time of the owner’s death. Id. at *10 
(“For, naturally speaking, the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion 
[over his property].”). There is some conflict over whether Blackstone viewed property rights 
as natural at all. Id. at *11; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 315 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, 
Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 607 n.22 (1998). 
174. Kendrick, supra note 165, at 151. 
175. Id. at 150–51. 
176. Id. at 162. As previously mentioned, she acknowledges that there is some debate over 
the question of whether Lockean property encompasses general transferability rights. Id. at 
165 n.93.  
177. Id. at 163. 
178. She admits that under her view, “the right of postmortem transfer is an instance of 
rule-consequentialism in furtherance of the fundamental law of nature.” Id. 
179. This is the case for separate property states. Community property states protect sur-
viving spouses by way of the “community” deemed to have formed. See, e.g., Terry L. Tur-
nipseed, Community Property v. the Elective Share, 72 LA. L. REV. 161, 163 (2011) (arguing 
for the preferability of community property systems). 
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Furthermore, the imposition of an estate tax by the federal government 
and certain states to some extent might signal the weakness of any nat-
ural right to transmit one’s full net worth at death.180  
But these aspects tell only a partial story. To begin with, deep-
rooted protections for surviving spouses can only loosely be character-
ized as reflecting a natural right to inherit by dependents. With respect 
to the relationship between spouses, Locke himself did not consider 
wives to be dependents of their husbands — at least not in ways com-
parable to the status of a man’s children, whose very existence was 
caused by him.181 Moreover, while married women in Locke’s era, and 
for centuries thereafter, were in fact quite dependent on their husbands 
because of the property rights they forfeited upon marriage,182 contem-
porary succession law principles reflect a trend toward grounding a sur-
viving spouse’s elective share rights upon economic partnership 
theories rather than upon more paternalistic support theories.183 In any 
event, no matter how the system is characterized, the surplus beyond 
the surviving spouse’s share does not revert to the common stock — it 
is distributed to the decedent’s beneficiaries or heirs, as the case may 
be.  
More fundamentally undercutting such a circumscribed scope of 
natural rights, all states (but one) have long permitted the disinheritance 
of children, even minor children, at the time of a parent’s death.184 
While the United States is increasingly an outlier among nations with 
respect to this policy — a trend that perhaps bespeaks a natural right of 
                                                                                                                  
180. At present, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have an estate tax (which ad-
dresses the donor); six states have an inheritance tax (which addresses the donee); and New 
Jersey and Maryland impose both forms of tax. See Liz Emanuel et al., State Estate and In-
heritance Taxes in 2014, TAX FOUND. (May 28, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/state-
estate-and-inheritance-taxes-2014 [http://perma.cc/X4Y8-FM7L]. 
181. A wife’s share in her husband’s estate was due to the labor she had contributed to the 
marital unit, or perhaps by agreement, in contrast to the share of children in their father’s 
estate, which was based on biological ties. LOCKE, supra note 32, TREATISE II § 183; accord 
Waldron, supra note 166, at 43.  
182. See, e.g., Margaret Valentine Turano, Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, and the Marital 
Property Law, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 180 (1998) (describing the draconian common 
law doctrine of coverture). 
183. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 2010); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the 
Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 151 (1994); Margaret Valentine Turano, UPC 
Section 2-201: Equal Treatment of Spouses?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 983, 983–84 (1992). There is, 
however, some debate over the extent to which these contemporary aspirations are actually 
reflected in the relevant laws and their implementation. See Brashier, supra, at 152; Hirsch, 
supra note 51, at 2226–27.  
184. See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 131 (2008) (“[E]very American state save Louisiana, has long al-
lowed testators to disinherit their children and grandchildren for any reason or no reason.”). 
Louisiana provides a forced share for children who are twenty-three or younger or who suffer 
from permanent and severe mental incapacity or physical infirmity. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 1493 (2012). These protections date back to the colonization of Louisiana by the French. 
Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship; Its History in Texas and Louisiana, 
4 LA. L. REV. 42, 58 (1941). 
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inheritance by dependents185 — American commitment to its position 
runs deep. Indeed, the U.S. courts that have addressed the issue have 
held that the right of testation — even to deprive a minor child of an 
inheritance — is “inalienable.”186 Nor does the imposition of the estate 
tax undermine the entrenched reverence with which the right of testa-
tion is held. The relatively high thresholds for the imposition of the es-
tate tax, especially at the federal level,187 permit a testator to direct the 
vast majority of her property at death. And, as Kendrick reminds us, 
“[i]t does not follow from the fact that a natural right is not absolute 
that it is not a natural right at all.”188 
In sum, American law does not prioritize a child’s right to support 
at the parent’s death — as does the natural law under both Waldron’s 
and Kendrick’s readings of Locke — let alone insist that any surplus 
(beyond the limited reach of the estate tax) return to the common stock. 
Instead, it accords great weight to testamentary freedom — a stance 
that Kendrick demonstrates is at least a possible interpretation of natu-
ral law. Such a broader view of testamentary freedom would seem in 
accord with a policy of extending copyrights beyond the death of the 
author and of giving the author wide discretion in deciding to whom 
those interests should be distributed. 
Some IP scholars are wary of a natural rights paradigm, fearing that 
such an interpretive move would require copyrights to endure perpetu-
ally.189 Others disagree, taking the position that rights need not be with-
out limitation in order to qualify as natural rights. Alfred Yen, for 
example, has posited that a foundational boundary is “possessabil-
ity” — that is, natural rights to property are limited to “fruits of . . . la-
bor . . . considered capable of permanent possession,”190 which 
                                                                                                                  
185. See, e.g., Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisi-
ana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1996). 
186. See Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1990) 
(holding that Florida’s state constitution protected an “inalienable right[]” to devise property 
at death); In re Estate of Beale, 113 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Wis. 1962) (holding “that the right to 
make a will is a sacred and constitutional right, which right includes a right of equal dignity 
to have the will carried out” even to deprive a minor child of inheritance). The Supreme Court 
has likewise indicated that the right to transmit property at death is “essential,” and that the 
right of testation is particularly sacrosanct. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716, 718 (1987). 
187. For example, federal law requires a return for estates with combined gross assets and 
prior taxable gifts that exceed $5,340,000 for decedents dying in 2014, see I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) 
(2012), and applies a tax rate of 40% to amounts exceeding that exempt amount, id. § 2001(c). 
It is true, however, that past rates have been higher. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra 
note 107, at 920 (noting estate tax rate reaching 77%). 
188. Kendrick, supra note 165, at 152. 
189. Cf. Reichman, supra note 85, at 643 (arguing that “a life-plus-fifty standard deviates 
from . . . the natural property rights thesis, which argues for perpetual protection on a par with 
the treatment of tangible property”).  
190. Yen, supra note 164, at 523–24 (drawing from both English and Roman principles 
and providing examples of the air, the seas, and the like that would be excluded under this 
framework). 
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exclude — in the case of IP — incorporeal ideas.191 Deven Desai ex-
tends this possession-based limitation to copyright duration, arguing 
that natural law justifies, at most, one’s right to the IP produced by 
one’s own labor to support oneself during life.192 Summoning Wal-
dron’s interpretation of Locke,193 Desai maintains that other than sup-
plying the needs of dependents, natural law provides little foundation 
for the descendibility of copyright interests and, therefore, that copy-
righted works should enter the public domain at the author’s death.194  
One might respond to Desai’s refutation of postmortem copyrights 
in the following ways. First, even on the narrow reading of natural law 
that he prefers, postmortem copyrights would be justified in the case of 
an author who died leaving behind minor dependent children and valu-
able copyrights — but not enough other items of property — to support 
those children.195 While such instances may not occur frequently, a pol-
icy of postmortem copyrights appears justified where they do. Second, 
as discussed above,196 Waldron’s view of the scope of postmortem 
rights under natural law is not the only view. There is, as Kendrick 
demonstrates, a strong argument to be made that natural law encom-
passes a more robust right of testation.  
Moreover, as shown above,197 to the extent that entrenched succes-
sion law policies can be used as an indicator of natural rights, those 
policies likewise reflect postmortem transmission rights beyond the 
bare minimum. While it is true that an author’s successors did not them-
selves labor on the copyrighted works, such is often true of the succes-
sors of other forms of property. There is no requirement that those who 
inherit the family farm have actually fed the chickens or milked the 
cows. Indeed, it may actually be harder to demonstrate that the common 
stock would be more enriched by the absorption of postmortem copy-
right interests than it would be by the absorption of other forms of 
wealth that pass at death.  
In sum, natural rights theories would seem to provide at least some 
support for the continuation of copyright interests beyond the death of 
the author as they do for the continuation of other interests beyond the 
death of the laborer.  
                                                                                                                  
191. Id. at 537–38. 
192. Desai, supra note 13, at 247. Although he does not say so explicitly, implicit in De-
sai’s argument is the notion that since, after death, an author is no longer able to possess 
anything, natural law justifications for her copyrights cease.  
193. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
194. Desai, supra note 13, at 249; see also id. at 221 (arguing that “copyright’s extension 
after the death of the author lacks theoretical grounding and is unjustified”). 
195. Cf. Saul Cohen, Duration, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1191–92 (1977) (arguing that 
“[a]ny term of years, unless very long, may result in a work falling into the public domain 
while the author or his spouse or minor children are still alive and in need” and favoring a 
term of life of the author plus twenty years). 
196. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 181–88 and accompanying text. 
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C. Intelligent Estate Planning Theories 
Another justification for testamentary freedom is intelligent estate 
planning. Not concerned with goals of wealth maximization,198 this jus-
tification posits that individuals are in a better position to dispose of 
their property than is the state.199 For example, intestacy laws, which 
provide for the transmission of property based on presumed intent,200 
are by their nature rough estimates. Intelligent estate planning theories 
support the status of intestacy laws as default rules that should yield to 
an individual’s more informed right of testation. A familiar example is 
the testator’s superior ability to take account of the differing needs of 
potential beneficiaries. Where two children, equally loved, achieve dif-
ferent levels of financial success, intelligent estate planning suggests 
that the law should permit the parent to accommodate this disparity 
through unequal dispositions, both during life and at death.  
There is, however, a fundamental difficulty with the use of intelli-
gent estate planning theories to justify testamentary freedom with re-
spect to any given interest, such as a copyright: these theories largely 
presuppose the answer to the question being asked, namely, to what 
extent should the interests survive the decedent at all? That is, intelli-
gent estate planning assumes a right of inheritance and primarily speaks 
to reasons to favor a right of testation.201 Framed another way, intelli-
gent estate planning does not presume that individuals are in the best 
position to judge the needs of their loved ones against the needs of 
members of society at large. 
This difficulty is at least partially surmountable, however, because 
intelligent estate planning also implicitly reflects other considerations 
besides a testator’s ability to assess raw need among potential benefi-
ciaries. For instance, a testator may wish to leave a house to one child, 
family heirlooms to another, and cash to yet another. These assets may 
all be worth equivalent monetary amounts, but the law will usually up-
hold the particularities of these choices.202 The reasons it does so reflect 
values in addition to ensuring need satisfaction in the next generation. 
Specifically, the upholding of such choices honors the testator’s judg-
ment — not just as to the assessment of bare financial need, but also as 
to who will most appreciate and best tend to an asset that holds senti-
mental significance to the testator. That is, a testamentary instrument 
                                                                                                                  
198. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 106, at 12. 
199. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, INCLUDING 
TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 3.1, at 135 (4th ed. 2010). Hirsch and Wang call this 
the “father knows best” hypothesis. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 106, at 12. 
200. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 106–107 on this distinction; see also Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 106, at 12 n.38. 
202. MCGOVERN, supra note 199 § 3.1, at 136. 
112  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 29 
 
can be seen as a final expression of a person that should be valued as 
such.203 
These considerations permeate default principles operative during 
the probate process. For example, where a testator has provided for an 
array of gifts in the form of cash, specific items (such as a diamond ring 
or family heirloom), and a catch-all residuary bequest for any remain-
ing property, the doctrine of abatement ensures that, if at all possible, 
the specific gifts make their way to their intended beneficiaries. This is 
so even if it means that the remaining cash and residuary beneficiaries 
receive nothing because all of the other assets are used to pay off cred-
itors.204 The rationale for this doctrine reflects the presumed senti-
mental weight that the testator attached to a particular item and her 
corresponding preference that the intended beneficiary receive that 
item intact rather than that all available assets be divided proportion-
ately among all beneficiaries. 
Intelligent estate planning thus has some parallels with the person-
hood justification for private property,205 under which property rights 
serve as a vehicle for “self-actualization, for personal expression, and 
for dignity and recognition” of individuality.206 In advancing this justi-
fication, Margaret Jane Radin claimed that certain “objects are closely 
bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we consti-
tute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.”207 Such 
things, like a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a home, are fun-
damentally different from things like bank account funds, which, if lost 
or stolen, are fungible with their monetary replacement value.208 For 
this reason, Radin argued, where personhood interests are at stake, they 
should bear on the resolution of disputes between competing claim-
ants.209 Personhood theories have also been extended to the realm of 
copyright, which recognizes that many creative works reflect the infu-
sion of personality by their creators.210 Thus one may paint a painting, 
                                                                                                                  
203. See David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 88 (2012). 
204. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 13-1.3 (McKinney 2014); UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 3-902 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 
2010). 
205. Contemporary delineation of this theory owes its origin to Margaret Jane Radin. See 
supra note 32. 
206. Hughes, supra note 23, at 330. 
207. Radin, supra note 32, at 959. 
208. Id. at 959–60. On the other hand, Radin takes pains to point out that “[w]hile I have 
argued that personal property should be specially recognized, I do not argue that there is no 
personhood interest even in fungible property.” Id. at 1008.  
209. Id. at 958, 987. 
210. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 23, at 330. Commentators have pointed out, however, 
that works protected by IP laws reflect a range of investments of personality. Desai, supra 
note 13, at 250 (explaining that “one may write a short story, and it may well be personal 
property in Radin’s sense of the term; or it may be a commissioned story, and one may write 
it with little personal connection to it”); see also Hughes, supra note 23, at 342 (advocating a 
nuanced approach before ruling out certain genres of works as devoid of indicia of personal-
ity). 
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take a photograph, or write a novel; where the resulting works reflect 
the personality or self of the creator,211 the argument runs, that aspect 
suggests that she should enjoy a privileged position with respect to the 
use of her work.  
But it does not immediately follow that a policy honoring the per-
sonhood interests of the living should likewise honor such interests 
among the dead. The question thus becomes how much purchase the 
personhood interests of the author should have with respect to the trans-
mission of copyrights at death. For, at first glance, the interests of the 
dead do not stack up well against the needs of the living — especially 
the expressive needs of the living — who may wish to use copyrighted 
works.212  
It is here that intelligent estate planning theories provide some prin-
cipled basis for giving weight to the former, for such theories bolster 
the personhood interests of the living while they are still living. That is, 
it seems likely that one would feel differently about one’s most treas-
ured possessions — and more to the point, about oneself — if one knew 
that although those possessions could be held onto during life, they 
would be dispersed to the public immediately upon one’s death.213 Un-
der such a system, a whole category of personhood-infused objects 
cited by Radin — family heirlooms — would never come into exist-
ence because each successive generation’s possessions would be con-
fiscated by the public. Given the ways in which authors invest 
themselves into many of their projects, a desire to bequeath (or provide 
for loved ones through) copyrights that persist beyond their deaths 
seems consistent with other kinds of particularized bequests and not 
merely fetishistic.214 
The chief difference, of course, is that the dispersal of IP to the 
public that would result from the elimination of postmortem copyrights 
                                                                                                                  
211. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (noting that 
“[p]ersonality always contains something unique” and thus even a “very modest grade of art 
has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone” that may be copyrighted); Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (noting that copyright protects man-
ifestations of “originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the part 
of the author”). 
212. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 
1242 (1996) (arguing that “given property’s role in filling out the individual personality, it 
would be particularly difficult to argue from Hegel that copyright protection should extend 
beyond the author’s death”); see also Desai, supra note 13, at 254 (noting that the right “is 
connected to the author’s life, and, like the Lockean view, does not support extension of cop-
yright interests after death”). 
213. See SHAVELL, supra note 109, at 68 (noting that “individuals who desire dead hand 
control will in fact suffer utility losses when they are alive, assuming that they anticipate that 
property will not be used in the way they want when they are dead”); Kendrick, supra note 
165, at 162, 165 (noting that “contemplating the bequest may afford the testator satisfaction 
during life”). 
214. Radin was clear that whatever leverage a personhood interest should provide, such an 
advantage should not come into play where a claimed interest was really a manifestation of 
an unhealthy “fetish.” Radin, supra note 32, at 969. 
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has practical consequences different from the forced confiscation of 
tangible property. Principally, a living author would not have to cope 
with the foreknowledge that, as would be the case for ordinary property, 
her successors would be deprived of access to, or the use of, the assets 
upon her death. Rather, authors would merely have to cope with the 
prospect that their successors would be deprived of exclusive control, 
which would now be shared with the public.215 In practical terms, the 
main casualties of such a policy shift would be the ability to ensure that 
only one’s successors could profit from one’s copyrighted works, could 
control the integrity of one’s works (including adaptations), and could 
limit the dissemination of private information contained in the works.  
Foreknowledge of these losses might affect an author’s personhood 
interests while she is still alive. But aspects of these casualties are con-
troversial. There is a genuine doctrinal question about whether copy-
right should serve as a vehicle for protecting the privacy interests of 
authors or others.216 Likewise, the social value of enforcing attempts to 
preserve the integrity of a work, especially after an author has died, is 
not entirely clear.217 Furthermore, the economic reasons behind the de-
rivative work right — preserving the author’s market for adaptations of 
her work218 — by definition disappear when the author has died without 
producing an adaptation. Some therefore argue that there is no policy 
reason to preserve rights to control the integrity of a work or adaptations 
for an author’s successors.219 
Nevertheless, there are ways to synthesize intelligent estate plan-
ning theories with copyright’s instrumental underpinnings in these re-
spects. With respect to privacy matters, even accepting their divergence 
from copyright’s core mission, a postmortem copyright period may 
well prevent authors from destroying diaries, correspondence, and 
                                                                                                                  
215. Where the intangible rights pertain to one or several physical copies over which the 
author retained control during life — such as a diary — she could of course rely upon her 
power to transmit the physical copies as a way of preserving her personhood interests even 
without postmortem copyrights. 
216. See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Laura 
A. Heymann, How to Write A Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the Copyright/Privacy 
Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 836 (2009); Deidré A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: 
Should Copyright Protect Privacy? 3 (Oct. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (discussing “the extent to which copyright ought to protect privacy interests”). Such 
doubts are only exacerbated when an author has died, since privacy rights themselves typi-
cally cease at death. See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
217. Some, while accepting the possibility that distortions or mutilations of a work may 
cause emotional harm to an author, argue that such pain is personal to the author. See Liu, 
supra note 85, at 447; cf. Deidré A. Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a 
Moral Right: A Case Comparison and Proposal, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511, 514 (2012) 
(arguing that the derivative work right is a form of moral right and should be recognized as 
such). 
218. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated on 
other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
219. Arewa, supra note 14, at 347; Liu, supra note 85, at 447. 
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memoirs — that is, the tangible works that represent the only embodi-
ment of a copyrighted work in which there is public interest (see espe-
cially quadrant (A) above). Destruction of such materials can be seen 
as antithetical to copyright’s goals of creation and dissemination. Thus, 
to the extent that a postmortem term permits an author to entrust a cho-
sen successor with control over the reproduction and dissemination of 
these sorts of works, such a policy is more likely to lead to the preser-
vation of these works for (eventual) public access.220 Intelligent estate 
planning theories, in this sense, fortify an author’s sense of posterity 
and choice not to destroy her work.  
With respect to control over a work’s integrity, assuring that the 
work is disseminated in the form chosen by the author is also arguably 
consistent with copyright’s goals of fostering the creation and distribu-
tion of works.221 While some works may be popular or influential 
enough to withstand distortion or adaptation relatively soon after pub-
lication — and still ensure public knowledge of the original — other 
works may take time to come into their own.222 For example, “static” 
works, such as books and photographs, may be capable of being differ-
entiated from later manipulations and adaptations — the plaintiff’s 
photographic portraits in the recent Cariou v. Prince litigation being 
one possible example.223 But “dynamic” works that are performed ar-
guably require sufficient public familiarity in order to ensure that same 
kind of differentiation.224 It is entirely possible that a work might still 
                                                                                                                  
220. This proposition is consistent with Jeanne Fromer’s thesis that personhood-regarding 
aspects of IP law can be reconciled with utilitarian aspects. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive 
Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1802 (2012) (describing how the 
duration of copyright, as keyed to the life of the author, reaffirms for authors the importance 
of their personhood interests and thereby may serve as an incentive to creativity). 
221. See Hughes, supra note 23, at 359; see also Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual 
Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 926 (1999) (arguing for 
recognition of “the interest of a vast number of non-owners in having cultural objects with 
stable meanings”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American 
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 69 (1985) (noting that “[p]rotection for creators’ 
personal rights . . . also enables society to preserve the integrity of its cultural heritage”). 
222. Even Seana Valentine Shiffrin, who has argued against Lockean foundations for 
strong IP rights, see supra note 162, acknowledges that certain kinds of works might “require 
prolonged exclusive or highly restricted use for their production to be possible, for their com-
municative purpose to be achieved, or for their meaning to be fully realized.” Id. at 157. But 
she does not appear to include published works or works of a deceased author in that category. 
See id. at 165 (acknowledging the possible need for exclusive control with respect to “works-
in-progress, private works, and perhaps unpublished works (of the living)” since “[t]hese 
works are not yet completely distinct from the person”). 
223. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). But see Subotnik, supra note 118, at 
974 (questioning whether such differentiation would have been likely before the dispute be-
came so well known). 
224. See, e.g., Mission Statement, THE KURT WEILL FOUND. FOR MUSIC, 
http://www.kwf.org/foundation/mission-statement [http://perma.cc/4CHH-Z9UT] (explain-
ing that the purpose of the foundation is to encourage “broad dissemination and appreciation 
of [Kurt] Weill’s music through support of performances, productions, recordings, and schol-
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be in its infancy phase of public familiarization at the time an author 
dies. Aware of that possibility, an author may be more likely to dissem-
inate her work if she knows that she can entrust a chosen successor with 
the exploitation of the work some time into the future.  
V. COSTS OF THE POSTMORTEM TERM 
Justifications for testamentary freedom thus provide at least some 
support for a policy of postmortem copyrights. Copyright protection 
that extends beyond the life of the author signals to authors that their 
choices about how to direct at death the interests they invested in during 
life will be honored.225 It ensures that, where valuable rights have been 
retained, the author’s family — in the paradigmatic case, a non-work-
ing spouse and/or minor children226 — or other chosen successors will 
be able to benefit financially from continued exploitation of the work. 
Such a policy thus arguably places value on an author’s natural rights 
and personhood interests, and it encourages, at least in theory, authors 
of all ages to invest themselves in creative endeavors, even if the prod-
ucts of those efforts may take time to find favor in the marketplace.227  
There are, however, significant social costs that flow from a system 
of postmortem copyrights. Here, too, succession law principles are 
helpful in arriving at a more refined picture of the costs and in begin-
ning to suggest means for addressing these costs short of a total cessa-
tion of postmortem copyrights.  
                                                                                                                  
arship” and foster “understanding of Weill’s and [Lotte] Lenya’s lives and work within di-
verse cultural contexts”); Interview with Kim H. Kowalke, President and CEO of the Kurt 
Weill Foundation For Music (June 26, 2014) (on file with author). 
225. See Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a “Lifetime-Plus-
Years” Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 480 (2002) (using behavioral economic approach and 
finding that “decision makers find a lifetime-plus-years stream of payments significantly 
more attractive than a stream lasting for a comparable fixed-term period”). 
226. There is some historical support for the claim that the postmortem term was aimed 
primarily at providing for an author’s immediate family after his or her death. The legislative 
history for what became the 1831 general revision of the Copyright Act of 1790 made specific 
appeal to the fact that if the author did not survive beyond the initial fourteen-year term, “the 
copy-right is determined, although, by the very event of the death of the author, his family 
stand, in more need of the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them.” 3 PATRY, supra 
note 77, at § 7:8 (quoting the 1830 House Judiciary Committee Report on the general revi-
sion). Likewise, the legislative history for what became the Copyright Act of 1909 reflected 
the need to “enable [the author] to provide for his children until they reach the age where they 
are likely to be self-supporting, or, if daughters, married.” S. REP. No. 59-6187, at 6 (1907). 
227. See Fromer, supra note 220, at 1802 (arguing that “copyright’s durational structure 
can serve as an expressive incentive, which can be particularly helpful to advancing copy-
right’s goal of encouraging artistic creations”). 
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A. Categorization of the Costs 
The problems associated with postmortem copyrights are often 
framed in one of three ways: as raising search costs that result in market 
failures, as reflecting dead-hand control, or as resulting from the my-
opic management by the living.  
1. Search Costs and Market Failures 
Creators often come across earlier works that they would like to 
use in their own works — uses for which, depending on the circum-
stances, they would seek authorization and be willing to pay a reason-
able license fee. Over time, tracing the chain of copyright title from the 
author to its present owners can make such an endeavor time-consum-
ing, expensive, and fraught with uncertainty.228 For example, because 
of the fundamental distinction between a copyright in the intangible 
work of authorship and an ownership right in a particular copy of the 
work, a documentary filmmaker can lawfully purchase a photograph 
but still not be able to use it in his film because he has not obtained 
permission from the copyright owner.229 As search costs become un-
reasonably high,230 they may give rise to market failures if the 
filmmaker forgoes use of what might be a contextually valuable image. 
Over time, the public may suffer because of such artistic compromises 
or, at the very least, because of delays in bringing such subsequent uses 
to market.231 
It is possible that the postmortem term raises these costs. While an 
author is still alive, he may be able to direct the filmmaker to the current 
rights holder even if the author long ago assigned these rights away. By 
contrast, upon the author’s death, and over the ensuing decades, the 
                                                                                                                  
228. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 251 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The 
older the work, the less likely it retains commercial value, and the harder it will likely prove 
to find the current copyright holder.”). See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author 
Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549 (2010). 
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
230. This problem has grown in scale following the congressional determination in 1976 
to dispense with formalities for copyright protection and to make copyright interests fully 
divisible. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.  
231. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, The Heir’s Not Apparent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2014, at 
C1. The article describes the “in limbo” status of the estate of Vivian Maier, a street photog-
rapher who came to prominence only after her death. Despite his apparent best efforts to iden-
tify the relevant rights holder — through the use of genealogists — and to pay for the rights 
to Maier’s work, a collector who “spent years tending and promoting her work through com-
mercial galleries, museum exhibitions, books and a recent documentary” has been prevented 
from further activity by the possible discovery of a long-lost heir living in France. The dispute 
threatens to undercut the collector’s own investment in Maier’s work, which was partly re-
sponsible for bringing it to public attention in the first place. The estate litigation also affects 
the public, since it has threatened to put an indefinite hold on future publication and exhibition 
of Maier’s work and “could prevent her work from being seen again for years.” Id.  
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availability of information required to trace the chain of title to the cop-
yright often lessens. It therefore may become more difficult for the 
good-faith user to track down the current owner.232  
Nevertheless, while real, the costs of tracing copyright ownership 
are not inherently a product of the postmortem feature itself.233 Rather, 
they appear to be more a function of the overall length of the copyright 
term and of the prominence of the work in the marketplace.234 Specifi-
cally, even if a copyright lasted only for the author’s lifetime, an author 
in his eighties, for example — merely because he was still alive — 
might not be in a position to retrace the ownership of rights he had 
transferred away in his thirties. Conversely, for an author who created 
a work yesterday but died today, it would often be relatively straight-
forward to identify the new owner of the copyright tomorrow. With re-
spect to works that retain great economic value over time, tracing the 
copyright ownership even after an author died long ago may be fairly 
simple.235 
2. Dead-Hand Control 
Ray Madoff has described the current copyright term as granting 
excessive rights to the dead.236 She argues that copyright interests 
should be distinguished from tangible property, not from a law and eco-
nomics view of an expressive work’s characteristics as a public good,237 
but from a cultural perspective. Specifically, given the way in which 
expressive works build upon each other, and given that the copyright 
holder can control adaptations, she argues that the duration of copyright 
harms social progress.238 Madoff links this problem to one of copyright  
                                                                                                                  
232. Karjala Statement, supra note 88. 
233. Indeed, Congress has attempted (so far, unsuccessfully) to ameliorate this problem — 
described in some contexts as the “orphan works” problem — not by curbing postmortem 
rights, but through limiting the remedies against users who make a diligent search for the 
copyright holder. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. 
(2008); Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works Act of 
2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006). 
234. Cf. Fromer, supra note 220, at 1801 (“It is important not to conflate [copyright] dura-
tion’s structure with its length.”). 
235. The types of protracted litigation over rights to John Steinbeck’s works and to various 
comic book character assets may, ironically, be proof of this in the sense that rival claimants 
tend to make themselves known. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 
124 (2d Cir. 2013); Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 196–97 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
236. MADOFF, supra note 21, at 121, 131, 154. 
237. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 126, at 14. 
238. MADOFF, supra note 21, at 144, 146–47. This line of argument has also been advanced 
in law and economics terms. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 126, at 69 (noting that “from 
an ex ante viewpoint every author is both an earlier author from whom a later author might 
want to borrow material and the later author himself,” and that copyright policy should thus 
balance the benefits and costs of reducing copying). 
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and “immortality.”239  
Others frame the objection even more squarely as extending con-
trol by the generally disfavored dead hand.240 This age-old concern with 
respect to the intergenerational transmission of property is that such 
control is costly from an economic perspective because it may prevent 
the efficient use of property. But while any adherence whatsoever to a 
decedent’s testamentary wishes could in some sense be categorized as 
a species of dead-hand control,241 such terminology is typically re-
served for situations in which a decedent seeks not merely to make out-
right distributions of property, but to control uses of property into the 
future.242  
Classic attempts at dead-hand control exist where a testator im-
poses a condition upon the receipt of property, such as the obligation to 
marry a spouse of a particular faith.243 Such control is typically seen in 
the context of private trusts, where a trust’s settlor (that is, its creator) 
seeks to direct the distribution of wealth several generations into the 
future.244 These issues frequently also arise with charitable trusts, 
where courts have long been pressed to balance donor intent with the 
reality of changed circumstances.245 
                                                                                                                  
239. MADOFF, supra note 21, at 143. As discussed below, see infra Part V.A.3, it is unclear 
to what degree Madoff’s real target is the lengthiness of the term, MADOFF, supra note 21, at 
146, or the management of rights by the living, see id. at 144–47. 
240. See, e.g., Garon, supra note 14, at 595 (footnote omitted) (“The Copyright Act of 
1976 explicitly created dead-hand control of copyrights by adopting a life-plus-50-year term, 
and the extension exacerbates this danger by twenty years — an additional generation.”); cf. 
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1373, 1385 (2000) (characterizing copyright term, and its extension, as an instance 
of dead-hand control granted to authors). 
241. For a passing articulation of the basic right of testation as implicating dead-hand con-
trol, see SIMES, supra note 48, at 3. 
242. The literature here is deep. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 33, at 711 (describing dead-
hand control as arising “when death does not result in a clean transfer to living persons that 
permits them to do with the money as they please”); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 106, at 5–6. 
Lord Hobhouse, a passionate nineteenth-century detractor of such control, colorfully argued 
that there was no justification why “because a man has been the possessor of property during 
his life, therefore he should continue to be its master while he is in his grave.” ARTHUR 
HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND: ADDRESSES ON THE SUBJECT OF ENDOWMENTS AND 
SETTLEMENTS OF PROPERTY 222 (London, Chatto & Windus 1880). 
243. See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1974) (dis-
cussing a will that imposed a requirement that the putative beneficiary marry “a Jewish girl 
whose both parents were Jewish” in order to receive his bequest).  
244. The very nature of a trust imposes the preferences of the settlor, who may be deceased, 
in ways that deprive the beneficiaries of outright possession of the property at the moment of 
the trust’s creation. This feature has been exacerbated by the rise in so-called incentive trusts, 
which are geared to encourage certain specified behaviors by beneficiaries. See, e.g., Joshua 
C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 445, 448, 453 (2006); J. Peder Zane, The Rise of Incentive Trusts; Six Feet 
Under and Overbearing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 1995), http://www.ny-
times.com/1995/03/12/weekinreview/ideas-trends-the-rise-of-incentive-trusts-six-feet-un-
der-and-overbearing.html [http://perma.cc/XG76-Y4WF]. 
245. This potential conflict has given rise to the cy pres doctrine, which permits courts to 
redirect the funds of a charitable trust whose purposes have become “unlawful, impossible, 
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It is true that authors and artists sometimes specify affirmative 
steps that they wish to be taken after their deaths. In some circum-
stances, the specified steps are to destroy certain of the creator’s ex-
pressive works because she views the works as incomplete, to protect 
privacy interests, or for some other reason.246 Franz Kafka and Justice 
Hugo Black famously ordered the destruction of certain works follow-
ing their deaths. In Kafka’s case, this included both written and oral 
instructions to his good friend Max Brod to destroy, among others, the 
unpublished manuscripts of The Castle and The Trial — instructions 
Brod did not follow.247 Justice Black more successfully instructed his 
son and his secretary to destroy his conference notes and internal com-
munications among the Justices, which he viewed as presenting a 
skewed historical record.248  
Short of explicitly ordering the purging of one’s works, an author 
may issue edicts regarding the future exploitation of the works. It is 
speculated, for example, that J.D. Salinger may have instructed the trust 
he created to adhere to his own artistic vision by not licensing a film 
version of Catcher in the Rye.249  
Detailed authorial instructions expressed at death, if given effect, 
can affect the subsequent uses of a work in ways that raise public policy 
concerns.250 In these situations, it seems fair to identify the issue as one 
of dead-hand control because the enforcement of such instructions im-
poses “control of past owners over future generations.”251 From the per-
spective of the public, these kinds of choices can exert what appears to 
be shortsighted restraint over the development and preservation of cul-
ture. In particular, requiring successors to enforce the destructive 
wishes of an author can obviously be problematic from a cultural her-
itage perspective — at least with respect to works that might reasonably 
be of interest to future users — because of the irreversibility of the 
                                                                                                                  
or impracticable.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also 
MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER, THE GREAT PHILANTHROPISTS AND THE PROBLEM OF “DONOR 
INTENT” 203–04 (3d ed. 2007).  
246. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 813, 830–
34 (2005). 
247. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 46–47 (1999); Strahilevitz, supra note 246, at 
830–31. For an interesting account of the chain of instructions given with respect to Kafka’s 
works, see Nili Cohen, The Betrayed(?) Wills of Kafka and Brod, 27 LAW & LITERATURE 1 
(2015). As Cohen points out, in forgoing testamentary formalities, “it would appear that Kafka 
imposed upon his friend a moral, not a legal, obligation.” Id. at 4. 
248. See SAX, supra note 247, at 100–01. The Justice also expressed concern that making 
a practice of releasing such documents would inhibit unfettered discussions among the Jus-
tices in the future. Id. at 100. 
249. See O’Neill, supra note 102, at 30. 
250. I explore this topic further in a forthcoming paper. See generally Eva E. Subotnik, 
Artistic Control After Death (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
251. Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law: 
Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
1525, 1553 (2007). 
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specified act.252 For that reason, such instructions are regularly disre-
garded.253 Furthermore, if the author is concerned about his own pri-
vacy interests, those interests vanish as a legal matter upon his death,254 
thereby weakening any basis for enforcing the instructions to destroy. 
The privacy interests of others can be dealt with through less drastic 
means, such as instituting a moratorium on access and/or publication.255 
Even the less drastic limitations on the use of a work, as in the possible 
Catcher in the Rye scenario, if given effect, can impose costs by disal-
lowing uses of a work that the living rights holders do not themselves 
object to.  
3. Suboptimal Stewardship by the Living  
In general, however, examples of explicit instructions by authors 
appear to be relatively rare.256 (Indeed, given the vast number of copy-
right interests created on a daily basis, such would have to be the case.) 
In some instances, successful or moderately successful authors may try 
to imprint their wishes through the selection of a literary executor or 
equivalent figure by whom they would like future choices about their 
works’ exploitation to be made.257 Such authors may express their 
wishes in a precatory (that is, non-binding) way to these individuals 
                                                                                                                  
252. Scholars have taken a variety of stances on this question. Joseph Sax, while acknowl-
edging the dilemmas faced by successors in the face of such instructions, argues that absent 
special circumstances, the “grounds favoring preservation ought to prevail.” SAX, supra note 
247, at 44. Such circumstances might exist where the author has left no doubt about his wishes 
and was unable to perform the act himself — as in the case of correspondence held by others. 
Id. Richard Posner has noted that one reason counseling against the enforcement of such in-
structions is that it is not possible to convince the dead to change their minds. POSNER, supra 
note 33, at 715–16. On the other hand, without such enforcement, authors might prematurely 
destroy their draft manuscripts. Id. at 716. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz has argued that destruction 
orders should be enforced because such a policy provides ex ante incentives to authors to 
undertake “high-risk, high-reward projects,” because authors are in the best position to deter-
mine their own artistic legacy, and because such destruction may itself serve as a mode of 
self-expression. Strahilevitz, supra note 246, at 832–33.  
253. POSNER, supra note 33, at 716; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of 
Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299, 329 (1991).  
254. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979); Rome Sentinel 
Co. v. Boustedt, 252 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 652I (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
255. See, e.g., Last Will and Testament of James I. Merrill 13 (Sept. 30, 1994) (permitting 
access “to my notebooks and journals prepared subsequent to 1980 only after fifteen (15) 
years from the date of my death”) (on file with author). 
256. Ironically, instructions by an author-testator to his beneficiaries that they deal liberally 
with their inherited copyright interests, if enforceable, would actually constitute indicia of 
dead-hand control. 
257. Unlike personal representatives, literary executors have no formal role during probate 
administration, see, e.g., Symposium, Estate Planning for Artists: Will Your Art Survive?, 21 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 15, 27 (1996), and may or may not inherit copyright interests 
themselves. They are typically charged, by contract or by will, with determining the contexts 
in which the author’s work will appear. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hellman, 511 N.Y.S.2d 485, 
488 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1987) (noting that the “management of a literary work requires a delicate 
balance between economic enhancement and cultural nurture”).  
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prior to death. Authors may, alternatively, simply request that the liter-
ary executor use good judgment in managing their corpus of works.258  
In many cases, however, authorial preferences with respect to fu-
ture exploitation of works are likely to be expressed solely through the 
choice to leave one’s copyright assets to Beneficiary X as opposed to 
Beneficiary Y. Indeed, the mere selection of a residuary beneficiary — 
or the choice to die intestate — may be the only affirmative display of 
control that an author makes. But, as just discussed,259 the mere desig-
nation of a successor-in-interest by a decedent is not typically catego-
rized as dead-hand control. Rather, American society has embraced a 
general right to direct the transmission of one’s property at death.260 
Applied too broadly, the dead-hand control label would be meaningless 
in identifying the sorts of transmissions that raise particular concerns 
about inefficiencies or inequities.  
Consistent with the tendency to reserve the dead-hand control des-
ignation for circumstances beyond the mere selection of a successor, 
the most useful aspect on which to focus is often the management of 
copyright interests by the living.261 For, while some successors do view 
their role as imbued with a duty to maximize access to and use of the 
works entrusted to them,262 others may disallow artistic or scholarly 
uses for nebulous reasons. In these cases, control over works by suc-
cessors can impose a cost on society. Rigid dominion over a work’s fate 
by literary executors, for example, may mean that only authorized bi-
ographies get produced, which can skew the historical record.263 But it 
is more accurate to describe these costs as resulting from the suboptimal 
management, or stewardship, of works by living successors than as a 
species of dead-hand control.  
While this distinction may strike some as overly pedantic, the rhe-
torical label matters. First, it more precisely captures the core phenom-
enon that appears to bother commentators the most, which generally is 
not that copyrights are held pursuant to restrictive testamentary instru-
ments but rather that the living are not managing them in the public’s 
                                                                                                                  
258. See, e.g., Interview with Edward Mendelson, literary executor for the W. H. Auden 
estate (May 15, 2014) (on file with author) (describing Auden’s instruction to Mendelson: 
“You must use your judgment.”). 
259. See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
260. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (equating the right to transmit at 
death with the right to exclude); FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 19; MADOFF, supra note 21, at 
57–58. 
261. Cf. Robert Spoo, Three Myths for Aging Copyrights: Tithonus, Dorian Gray, Ulysses, 
31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 77, 109 (2012) (“The phrase ‘the dead hand’ comes irresisti-
bly to mind, except that it is a living hand that is allowed to reach out to control the sponta-
neous choices of the public domain.”). 
262. See Spoo, supra note 13, at 1827 (discussing generous grants of access by the estates 
of W.B. Yeats and Ezra Pound). 
263. See SAX, supra note 247, at 143–45 (discussing contexts of authorized biographies of 
Langston Hughes and Judge Learned Hand). 
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interest. Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay in 1841 famously de-
nounced a proposal that would have extended the copyright term in 
Britain to life of the author plus sixty years.264 One of Macaulay’s prin-
cipal arguments was steeped in the concern that an author’s descend-
ants, hostile for whatever reason to their forebear’s works, might 
suppress them and thereby deprive society — and the ages — of works 
such as Boswell’s Life of Johnson. Indeed, Boswell’s oldest son had 
made plain his desire to so suppress that work.265  
In contemporary times, much of the documented evidence of the 
postmortem term’s pernicious effects comes from a number of well-
known successors to a group of predominantly British, Irish, and Amer-
ican poets, playwrights, and novelists. These successors are frequently 
cited for their bad behavior.266 For example, the successor to James 
Joyce’s copyrights, his grandson Stephen James Joyce, has caused 
much distress through his seemingly idiosyncratic refusals to license 
uses of his grandfather’s work.267 Such refusals have taken the forms 
of multiple attempted curtailments of scholarly use and wider cultural 
celebrations of Joyce’s work — even those to mark the centenary of 
Bloomsday.268  
Or, to take another example, consider the experience of Kurt Von-
negut’s authorized biographer, Charles Shields.269 Shields had devel-
oped a working relationship with Vonnegut late in Vonnegut’s life in 
order to write a “big literary biography” of Vonnegut.270 Immediately 
after their second interview, Vonnegut fell down some steps and 
slipped into a coma, never to reawaken.271 Shields completed a draft of 
the biography, which quoted 258 of the 1,500 Vonnegut letters he had 
uncovered, but he was ultimately prevented from using any quotations 
                                                                                                                  
264. Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 
5, 1841), in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF LORD MACAULAY 609, 612 
(London, Longmans, Green, & Co. 1889). 
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by the Vonnegut estate — despite the fact that Vonnegut himself had 
authorized Shields’s biography.272 
It is true that an author has some causal relationship to this phe-
nomenon by selecting his successor (either actively or by default), and 
this is presumably at least partly what Madoff means by linking copy-
right’s durational ills to the theme of “immortality.”273 But at the end 
of the day, she and others do not suggest that dying authors regularly 
go out of their way to select successors whom they believe will be es-
pecially eccentric or selfish. Rather, the concern usually voiced is about 
how the living are exercising their control over copyrights.274 Indeed, 
in some cases, commentators have specifically criticized copyright suc-
cessors for deviating from what their ancestors would have wanted.275 
Perhaps the greatest downside to the dead-hand control branding is that 
its rhetorical force unfairly downplays any legitimate basis for post-
mortem copyrights. At the same time, it unhelpfully depicts living suc-
cessors as mere pawns of their author-forebears with no duty to wield 
their inherited copyright holdings in a socially responsible way. 
B. Nascent Proposals to Address Costs 
This Article has attempted to demonstrate two things. It has argued 
that there is a stronger foundation for postmortem copyrights than crit-
ics of the policy have acknowledged. Specifically, it contends that any 
debate over the existence and scope of postmortem copyrights should 
take into account not just general property theories but also theories and 
doctrines from succession law. In addition, it argues that the costs flow-
ing from the postmortem term should be properly categorized, and that 
suboptimal stewardship by successors, rather than dead-hand control, 
is often the real culprit.  
The question becomes how to address these costs short of eliminat-
ing postmortem copyrights altogether, which, as has been demon-
strated, do find at least some support in succession law. One possibility 
is to shorten the postmortem term. Such a shortening would directly 
address the length of time copyright interests are controlled by the au-
thor’s successors. A lifetime term plus some additional period of pro-
tection, short of seven decades, could still be consistent with the 
succession law principles discussed herein.276 For example, a post-
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text.  
275. See supra text accompanying note 11; cf. Spoo, supra note 13, at 1827 (noting that 
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276. Cf. Samuel J. Elder, Duration of Copyright, 14 YALE L.J. 417, 418 (1905) (“Certainly 
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death period of five decades, as recently proposed by the Register of 
Copyrights,277 might be sufficient to accommodate the intelligent estate 
planning goals of a decedent-author in effectuating her preferred plan 
of distribution among her known successors. It might also sufficiently 
accommodate a natural right of testation, permitting the author to dis-
tribute freely her copyrights upon her death even if those interests did 
not persist for seven decades.  
Alternatively, accepting the existence of both some period of post-
mortem protection and the reality that that period will come to a close, 
onerous dead-hand control provisions, where they do exist, might be 
scaled back. In addition, by channeling the well-developed duty of pru-
dence required of trustees,278 we could seek ways to encourage succes-
sors of copyright interests to manage and invest copyrights as a prudent 
copyright holder would. Such a duty could involve forethought about 
preserving the long-term value of works — not only in the sense of 
economic value, but also in the sense of cultural heritage value. 
Whether such encouragement should come in the form of enforceable 
duties — as in the case of trust law — or of behavioral norms remains 
to be developed in future scholarship.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Much ink has been spilled over the issue of copyright duration. Re-
cently, arguments have been lodged against the very existence of a post-
mortem term. While the concerns driving these arguments are real, the 
debates have not yet fully engaged with whether and how succession 
law principles, which govern other property or property-like interests, 
bear upon the transmission of copyright interests. Such an analysis re-
veals at least some justifications for a postmortem term. Nevertheless, 
the differences between copyrights and traditional property interests 
counsel in favor of caution with respect to an extended postmortem 
term. For these reasons, calls to shorten the current term should be con-
sidered seriously. Should that effort fail — and even if it does not — 
further work is needed to arrive at ways to improve the stewardship of 
the postmortem term by copyright successors. 
                                                                                                                  
277. See The Register’s Call for Updates to the U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. 7 (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, U.S. Register of Copyrights) (raising 
the possibility of “reverting works to the public domain after a period of life plus fifty years 
unless heirs or successors register their interests with the Copyright Office”). 
278. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3 (McKinney 2014); UNIF. 
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1994). 
